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I.

INTRODUCTION

In order to allocate income tax liabilities properly, a tax must be
imposed at the correct time. An unwarranted deferral of tax results
in the permanent undertaxation of transactions, while unwarranted acceleration has an opposite and equally inaccurate effect.
Under the current taxing regime, the most significant determinant
of the timing of taxation is the classification of a receipt as one
entitled to the pattern of taxation applicable to debt rather than
the pattern applicable to income. Accordingly, the timing, and thus
the accuracy, of taxation is largely controlled by how "debt"· is defined for income tax purposes.
This classification issue is one of the most pervasive problems in
our current income tax scheme. The benefits of the pattern for
taxing debt are claimed not only for conventional loans, but also
for such diverse transactions as security deposits, advance payments for goods and services, and obligations to incur future costs,
As a result, an incorrect understanding of what should be treated
as debt for income tax purposes can produce inaccurate taxation
on an extensive scale. However, despite the need for a clear and
workable definition of debt, the income tax rules contain two fundamentally inconsistent approaches to the problem. Neither of the
approaches is correct. In large part, the failure to properly define
debt is attributable to disagreement and confusion over the manner in which the income tax rules should reflect time value of
money principles. 1
' For useful discussions of the seemingly self-evident proposition that a dollar in the future is worth less than a dollar today, see Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 722, 725-728 (1990); Lokken, The Time Value of Money Rules, 42 Tax
L. Rev. 1, 10-18 (1986).

1991]

Redefining Debt

589

Any claim that a receipt ought to be subject to the pattern of
taxation applicable to debt is necessarily based upon the recipient
having an obligation to incur an economic cost in the future that
offsets the accretion to wealth otherwise generated by the receipt.
Accordingly, whether a receipt is to be treated as debt for income
tax purposes is determined, not by reference to the receipt as such,
but by the effect given to that future obligation at the time the
receipt is obtained. Debt is· defined, therefore, by the extent to
which obligations to incur future costs are recognized as offsetting
the value of a receipt.
The judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, traditionally has defined debt solely by reference to the quality of the obligation to
repay the receipt. 2 This approach does not take into account the
time value of money, and requires fully recognizing, or fully ignoring, the repayment obligation. Congress and the Treasury Department, on the other hand, have over the past decade developed a
new definition of debt that is primarily based upon the time value
of money and generally requires recognizing only a portion of the
repayment obligation, while treating the balance as additional interest. 3 In the wake of these legislative developments, it has been ·
suggested that all or portions of the congressional definition of
debt should be judicially adopted in a variety of contexts.• However,· in two recently decided cases, United States u. Hughes
Properties, Inc. 5 and Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light
• See generally Popkin, The Taxation of Borrowing, 56 Ind. L. J. 43, 49c65 (1980).
• That definition is embodied in I.R.C. § 7872. See also I.R.C. §§ 483, 467 and 1274. These
statutory definitions are not by their terms comprehensive. Rather, they serve to limit what
otherwise would be treated as debt for income tax purposes, and thus presuppose a prior
determination that the transaction involves an extension of credit. However, the sections are
intended to apply to transactions that might not be treated as loans under the judicial definition of debt. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33557 (Aug. 20,
1985).
• To date, this approach has generally been rejected. For example, in Follender v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 943 (1987), the government argued that the amount borrowed for purposes of the § 465 at-risk rules should be limited to the present value of the repayment
obligation. The court, however, concluded that the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") did not
require consideration of the time value of money in making that computation. See also
Pritchett v. Co~missioner, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987). However, in Pleasant Summit Land
Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 260 (1989), the
court allowed the taxpayer a basis for property equal to its market value notwithstanding
the fact that it was subject to a non-recourse debt in a greater amount. For a critique of that
decision, see Johnson, The Front End of the Crane Rule, 47 Tax Notes 593 (Apr. 30, 1990) .
• 476 u.s. 593 (1986).
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Co., 6 the Supreme Court firmly rejected the congressional approach and reaffirmed its allegiance to a definition of debt that
ignores the time value of money. Completing the mosaic, in one
significant instance Congress rejected its own definition of debt
and sought to blend time value of money considerations with the
traditional judicial approach. 7
This article will examine a variety of contexts in which these inconsistent approaches to the recognition of repayment obligations
appear. 8 While elements of each approach should be preserved,
this article will. argue that neither the judicial nor the congressional scheme appropriately imports time value of money principles into the taxing system. Debt simply cannot be defined properly without reference to the time value of money. In that respect,
· the judicial approach is fatally defective and continues to result in
the inaccurate taxation of a wide range of transactions. Moreover,
while the congressional bifurcation approach to debt may appear
to be more accurate in measuring the real economic gain realized
by borrowers at the time the transaction is initiated, 9 this in fact is
not the case. The implementation of time value of money concepts
does not require, or justify, the creation of fictitious interest
through the bifurcation of a single repayment obligation. The congressional approach is based upon a false analogy to discounted

• 110 S. Ct. 589 (1990). In the lower court proceedings, the United States Tax Court, 88
T.C. 964 (1987), ruled that the taxpayer, a utility company, properly excluded certain customer deposits from gross income. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 857 F.2d 1162,
1163 (7th Cir. 1988). See infra notes 14-26 and accompanying text. For other treatments of
this case, see Prescott, Customer Deposits: Tax-free Security or Prepaid Income?, 41 U. Fla.
L. Rev. 773 (1989); Burke & Friel, Tax-free Security: Reflections on Indianapolis Power &
Light, 12 Rev. Tax'n. Indiv. 157 (1988).
7
See I.R.C. § 461(h); infra text accompanying notes 116-22.
• The issue considered here is the proper timing of the inclusion or exclusion of an item
from income. The question of what should be treated as debt can arise in a very different
context. For example, the troublesome question of whether an investment in a corporation
should be treated as debt or as stock normally raises issues concerning the double taxation
of corporate profits rather than the timing of taxation. These other issues are not considered
herein. An obligation that would be treated as debt under the principles developed here
might, quite consistently, be treated as something else for other purposes of the taxing
system.
• The perception that the congressional approach is superior is the primary source of
pressure on the judiciary to incorporate the congressional definition of debt. See Illinois
Power Co. v. Commissioner, 792 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir. 1986), in which Judge Posner refers
to taxation based upon the present value of a receipt as "analytically sounder" than taxation based upon the likelihood of repayment.
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debt and does not produce a result that is consistent with the principles of income taxation. In fact, receipts that are wholly interestfree can be taxed correctly only under the ali-or-nothing approach
of the judiciary, applied with due regard to the significance of the
time value of money. Accordingly, the congressional experiment
with the bifurcation of non-interest bearing repayment obligations10 should be terminated, instead of being extended to other
forms of obligations to incur future costs, as some commentators
have urged. 11
After examining the judicial and congressional definitions of
debt, Part II of this article will demonstrate the consistencies and
inconsistencies of both approaches vis-a-vis the principles of an income tax. That exploration provides a basis for developing, in Part
Ill, a correct and uniform definition of debt and a superior approach to the taxation of obligations bearing below-market rates of
interest. The proposed approach to the taxation of debt would not
only correctly reflect the time value of money, but would also materially simplify the resolution of numerous classification issues
surrounding debt. 12
Part IV will demonstrate how the principles developed in Part
III can be applied not only to conventional loans, but also to such
quasi-loan transactions as advance payments and obligations to incur future costs. Part V emamines the significance of l)Ot repaying
the receipt and shows that the congressional bifurcation approach
to debt aggravates existing inadequacies in the taxation of debt
cancellations. Part VI will demonstrate the proper implementation
of the new definition of debt proposed in Part III. Part VII argues
that the imperfections in the current taxation of debt are not off•• Receipts that are offset by repayment obligations that bear a below-market rate of
interest must be bifurcated to be taxed correctly, but not in the manner presently required.
See infra text accompanying notes 145-52.
11
See Fellows, Future Costs Reconsidered: A Reevaluation of IRC Section 461(h), 44 Tax
Notes 1531 (Sept. 25, 1989); Halperin & Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Basic Principles Revised, 38 Tax Notes 831 (Feb. 22, 1988); Kiefer, The Tax Treatment of a
'Reverse Investment', 26 Tax Notes 925 (Mar. 4, 1985).
•• While the point is not developed here, the traditional judicial approach to the definition of debt, which relies primarily on an open-ended facts and circumstances analysis, is
highly complex to administer. See, e.g., Robertson, Daughtrey & Burckel, Debt or Equity?
An Empirical Analysis of Tax Court Classification During the Period 1955-1987, 47 Tax
Notes 707 (May 7, 1990); Prescott, Customer Deposits: Tax-Free Security or Prepaid Income?, 41 U. Fla. L. Rev. 773 (1989). Classification based upon the financial analysis suggested here would be far easier to administer.
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set by the "surrogate" taxation of the other party to the transaction. This section also examines revenue loss attributable to the
flawed approach to debt currently in use. Part VIII illustrates how
the bifurcation approach contained in section 7872 13 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") is inconsistent with a number of longstanding tax rules.
II.

THE CoNFLICTING DEFINITIONS OF DEBT

A.

The Judicial Test

One of the most recent statements describing the judicial approach to defining debt can be found in the unanimous decision of
the Supreme Court in Indianapolis Power. 14 The factual setting
for Indianapolis Power is particularly significant in that it describes a situation that is quite commonplace. The taxpayer, a
public utility furnishing electric power, required approximately
five percent of its customers to make cash deposits, in an amount
that could not exceed two months' billings, to secure the payment
of the customers' utility bills. 15 Interest at six percent was only
paid on deposits held for more than one year. 16 The deposits were
refunded to customers who established their creditworthiness by,
among other methods, the timely payment of bills for nine
months. 17 For that reason, the refund of deposits was normally by
cash or check, although a customer could request that the refund
be credited to his bill. 18 However, when a refund was made because
of a termination of service, the· refund was normally applied
against the customer's final bill, although the customer could demand repayment by cash or check. 19 Depending upon the year, between fifty-seven and sixty-nine percent of refunds were accomplished by a credit to the customer's bill.2° Refunds of deposits
th~t remained unclaimed after seven years escheated to the State
•• All references to "section - " in this article are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as amended, unless otherwise noted.
•• See supra note 6.

•• 110 S. Ct. at 590-91.
•• ld. at 591.
" Id.
18 ld.
"Id.
•• Indianapolis Power, 88 T.C. at 969.
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of Indiana. 21
During the years at issue in Indianapolis Power, the total
amount of deposits held by the utility taxpayer averaged about
$1,000,000. That amount was not segregated by the taxpayer, but
instead became a part of its operating funds. 22 Thus, the taxpayer
had permanent possession of an unrestricted fund of $1,000,000 for
which it paid a rate of interest that, quite likely, was well below its
cost of other capital. 23 For income tax purposes, the taxpayer
treated these receipts as "deposits" subject to the pattern of taxation applicable to loans. The Commissioner treated the entire
amount of the deposits as taxable income when received.
In an opinion by Judge Flaum, the Seventh Circuit24 r~solved
the dispute by exploring whether the taxpayer had obtained the
economic benefits associated with a permanent receipt or the benefits associated with obtaining the proceeds of a loan. Because the
taxpayer was required to pay interest on the receipt in an amount
that the courts assumed, perhaps erroneously, approximated a
market rate of interest, the court concluded that the taxpayer had
only obtained the economic benefits of a loan. Thus, the court allowed the taxpayer to exclude all of the deposits from income. 26
While the issue was not before it, the court plainly indicated that,
had interest not been paid on the deposit, the deposit would have
been taxed in full because then the taxpayer would have obtained
the greater economic benefits of an item of income. 26
The Supreme Court, while affirming the Seventh Circuit, viewed
the matter quite differently. Initially, the Court denied that a basis
existed for distinguishing between the economic benefits of income
and the benefits of loans. 27 While noting that the court below
viewed the payment of interest as significant, the Court declined to
discuss the relevance of interest payments. Rather, in line with its
prior decisions, the Court held that the critical factor in determining whether the deposit should be subject to tax was the degree to

11

••
••
••
••
••
17

110 S. Ct. at 591.
ld.
ld. at 592.
857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1168.
ld.
110 S. Ct. at 593.
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which the taxpayer controlled the receipt. 28
Under the tests for income first set forth in the Supreme Court's
1955 ruling in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 29 receipts over
which "taxpayers have complete dominion" constitute taxable income, while receipts subject to "an obligation to repay" do not.
Thus, the key to the decision in Indianapolis Power was whether
the taxpayer had "some guarantee that he will be allowed to keep
the money." 30 Since concededly the customers of the taxpayer were
legally entitled to demand the_ ultimate return of their deposits (although generally they did not), the Court easily concluded that the
deposits were not subject to tax. 31 As a result, the entire principal
amount of the security deposits became subject to the pattern of
taxation applicable to debt.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Indianapolis Power was
entirely consistent with its earlier income tax decisions. 32 In these
earlier cases, the question of taxation was resolved solely by reference to the taxpayer's legal entitlement to retain the principal
amount of the receipt. If the obligation to repay the receipt was
merely a contingent obligation that depended upon future events,
the obligation might be ignored entirely and the entire receipt subject to tax. Thus, in North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 33 the
taxpayer was deemed to have obtained possession of a cash payment in 1917 even though its entitlement to the payment remained
in dispute until 1922, when the litigation against the United States
was resolved. The Court held that the entire amount of the payment constituted income in 1917 because the taxpayer had acquired the requisite control over the payment. 34 The justices gave
no effect to the value of the contingent liability to repay the
amount, in the event the taxpayer lost the later litigation. On the
other hand, if the receipt were subject to a fixed obligation to re- ·
pay its face amount, it could not be subject to tax regardless of the
likelihood of repayment or the actual value of the repayment
obligation.
18
ld .
•• 348 u.s. 426 (1955).
•• 110 S. Ct. at 593.
" ld. at 596.
11
See infra notes 33-7 and accompanying text.
•• 286 u.s. 417 (1932).
" ld. at 423-24.
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The rigidity of the Court's historic position has on occasion produced embarrassment and minor doctrinal modification. In Commissioner v. Wilcox, 36 for example, the Court concluded that an
embezzler could not be subject to tax on his ill-gotten gain because
of the obligation to repay his employer - an obligation that
seemed unlikely to be honored. The Court, of course, was ultimately required to disown that impractical result, but it did so in a
manner that preserved its general approach to the definition of
debt. To accomplish the taxation of illegally obtained receipts, in
James v. United States 36 the Court modified its definition of repayment obligations entitled to recognition to require a "consensual recognition" of the obligation by the taxpayer. 37 However, the
decision in James was consistent with the decisions in North
American Oil and Wilcox in either wholly including or wholly excluding the receipt from income, and in attributing no further significance to the probability or value of repayment. ·
A similar approach has characterized other recent Supreme
Court demarcations of the line between income and loans (or
quasi-loans). Just three years prior to the decision in Indianapolis
Power, in Hughes Properties 38 the Court had permitted a taxpayer
to exclude receipts from income to the extent that these amounts
were subsequently payable to the patrons of its slot machines, even
though these repayment obligations were deferred for an unknown
period of time. The Court noted that the government had argued
that the present tax benefit ignored "the time value of money" but
the Court declined to even examine the merits of that assertion. 39
Similarly, in Commissioner v. Tufts' 0 the Court treated the face
amount of a non-recourse debt as entitled to recognition as debt,
even though the value of the encumbered property, and thus the
value of the obligation to repay the debt, was a vastly smaller sum.
The judicial approach to the definition of debt thus consists of
•• 327 u.s. 404 (1946) .
•• 366 u.s. 213 (1961).
•• ld. at 219.
63
See supra note 5.
•• 476 U.S. at 604. While the Supreme Court certainly assumes the responsibility for its
own decisions, a significant share of the blame for the decision in Hughes Properties rests
with the government. The government's attempt to justify using time value of money principles was so weak and inept as to lack any persuasive power. See, e.g., Brief for the United
States, p. 31.
•• 461 u.s. 300 (1983).
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two distinct, albeit related, principles. On the one hand, the value
of a repayment obligation is· relevant only in the sense that the
likelihood of repayment affects the value of the obligation and determines whether the obligation will be recognized. Once the court
has concluded that the obligation is sufficiently fixed to warrant
recognition, the actual value of the repayment obligation, and thus
the time value of money, becomes wholly irrelevant. On the other
hand, debt is an "aU-or-nothing" proposition." 1 If the repayment
obligation is entitled to recognition, the receipt may be offset by
the entire face amount of the obligation. If the receipt is not entitled to recognition, then no amount of the obligation may offset
the taxation of the receipt.·

B.

The Congressional Test

Beginning in 1964, Congress began to develop a definition of
debt distinct from that employed by the Supreme Court.' 2 The
congressional definition emerged from, and was shaped by, a process that began with a very different objective than that of the
courts. As a general proposition, under our income tax laws income
derived from different sources has been subjected to substantially
different rates of tax. Ordinary recurring income has been subject
to the generally applicable marginal rates of tax, which at times
have been quite substantial, while gain from the disposition of
property held for investment purposes has been eligible for the
special, and far lower, rate of tax imposed upon capital gains." 3
During most years in which the income tax has been imposed,
therefore, taxpayers had a considerable incentive to disguise ordinary receipts, such as interest, as gain from the sale of a capital
asset. Thus, for example, rather than sell an asset for a note in the
amount of $1,000, maturing in two years and bearing a market rate
of interest of 10%, a taxpayer might purport to sell the asset for
$1,210, payable in two years, and treat that full amount as gain
from the sale.
·
During the early years of the income tax laws, taxpayers were
., Cf. Popkin, supra note 2, at 46.
· •• See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
•• For a useful summary of the relationship between the ordinary and capital gains rates
of tax, see Brinner & Munnell, Taxation of Capital Gains: Inflation and Other Problems,
New Eng. Econ. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1974, at 3.
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not required to charge interest on deferred payments or characterize any portion of a deferred receipt as interest." Eventually, Congress became aware of the tax avoidance potential of concealed interest payments and in 1964 enacted section 483 of the Code' 11 to
address the matter. Under section 483, if a sale of property for deferred payments did not provide an adequate stated rate of interest, then a portion of the selling price would be recharacterized as
unstated interest.
In arriving at its result, section 483 required the bifurcation of
the sale proceeds by identifying and taxing separately an amount
that represented interest on the deferred payment. 46 That interest
component was identified by first computing the present value of
all payments to be made under the contract of sale, using a prescribed interest rate. 47 That computed amount presumably represented the price for which the property would be sold in an arm's
length transaction for an immediate cash payment; the amount
would also represent the principal amount of a note that .would
have been issued in exchange for the property if the note bore
stated interest at the prescribed rate. Accordingly, only that computed principal amount of the deferred payment was to be treated
as the proceeds from the sale of the property, and thus made eligible for the rate of taxation applicable to capital gains. 48
Scheduled note payments that exceeded the computed present
value of the repayment obligation were characterized as compensation to the seller for deferring the receipt of the sale proceeds." 9
This amount was not treated as additional gain from the sale, and
therefore was characterized as interest. Under section 483, it is so
characterized for all tax purposes. 110 With refinements reflecting
the continuing sophistication of the Treasury Department in measuring the time value of money, 111 the basic pattern of section 483

•• See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); Kingsford Co. v. Commissioner, 41
T.C. 646 (1964).
•• Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 224(a) (1964).
•• See I.R.C. § 483(a).
47
Under current law, the interest rate used is the "applicable federal rate" determined
under I.R.C. § 1274(d).
·
•• See H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 72-74 (1963), 1964-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 125,
332-35 (1963).
•• See I.R.C. § 483(a)-(b).
00
See I.R.C. § 483(a).
•• Under § 1274, which today applies to larger sales of property for a deferred payment,
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continues to serve as the Code method for identifying the element
of interest in sales for deferred payments.
While section 483 had long addressed the issue of identifying interest upon the transfer of property for a deferred payment, no
provision of the Code addressed the related question in the context
of a transfer of cash for a deferred repayment. In that statutory
vacuum, taxpayers began to realize the tax advantages of making
"interest-free" loans. 112 The government's attempt to persuade the
courts to find an element of interest in such transactions met with
no success until the issue finally reached the Supreme Court in
1984.113 Although not addressing the rather messy- but ultimately
unavoidable - issue of valuation, in Dickman v. Commissioner~~'
the Court approved in principle the treatment of the foregone interest in an interest-free loan as taxable for gift tax purposes.
While it seemed certain that the principle of Dickman would be
extended to income taxation, Congress was determined to avoid
that lengthy and uncertain process, and enacted section 7872 in
the same year. 1111
Under section 7872, a cash receipt purporting to be the proceeds
of a loan is divided into two portions: one portion treated as a loan
for income tax purposes, and the other treated as a functionally
unrelated payment, 116 the tax consequences of which are dependent
upon the relationship between the borrower and the lender. 117 In
common with section 483, the portion of the receipt that is to be
treated as the principal amount of a loan, and thus excluded from

the computed interest is treated as original issue discount and is subject to the rules of
§ 1272. Thus, interest must be accrued annually, regardless of when paid, and is accrued
using principles. of compound interest. See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(3).
•• High bracket parents, for example, wishing to shift the tax consequences of the receipt
of investment income to their lower bracket children could do so through the making of an
interest-free loan to the children that could then be invested by them. Similarly, the shareholders of closely held corporations wishing to withdraw cash without immediate tax consequences could do so through loans. The failure to charge interest on such a loan would avoid
the counter-productive return of cash (and taxable income) to the corporation.
•• See, e.g., Commissioner v. Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982); Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) .
.. 465 u.s. 330 (1984).
•• Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 172(a) (1984). For a comprehensive analysis of § 7872, see Lokken, supra note 1, at 200-51.
.. See I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1).
•• Thus, for example, the unrelated payment may be a non-taxable gift or contribution to
the capital of a corporation. It could also be taxable compensation or a dividend.
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income, is determined by computing the present value of the repayment obligation using a prescribed rate of interest that represents a pre-tax market rate of return.'18 The excess of the receipt
over that computed amount is treated as an unrelated payment
(either taxable income or a gift). 119 The amount payable on the maturity of the loan in excess of the amount treated as the principal
of the loan represents the interest that would have been paid on an
arm's length loan, 60 and is so treated for all purposes of the Code.
The amount treated as interest will equal the amount initially
treated as being other than the proceeds of a loan. 61
Section 7872 thus consists of several distinct elements. First and
foremost, the amount taxed (or remaining untaxed) is determined
by reference to value rather than face amount. Second, ·in application of that principle, a portion of the initial receipt is recharacterized so as not to be treated as the proceeds of. a loan, and thus is
normally taxable. Third, an equivalent portion of the repayment
obligation is recharacterized as interest, rather than principal, and
thus is normally made deductible. The net effect of the application
of section 7872, therefore, is to impose a tax on a portion of an
interest-free receipt that is subsequently offset by the grant of a
deduction for an identical amount.
Section 7872 does not, of course, alter the underlying economic
arrangement of the parties. The total amount received by the
lender will not exceed the amount originally transferred. The interest created by bifurcating the receipt is entirely artificial; economically the transaction remains interest-free. While similar in form to
section 483, section 7872 thus plays a very different role. The earlier provision was designed to identify an interest component that
was thought to exist but to have been concealed; section 7872, by
contrast, was designed to create an element of interest that clearly
did not exist before.
•• See I.R.C. § 7872(0(1)-(2). The test rate is derived from taxable federal obligations
having maturities similar to the maturity of the loan in issue. See I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1)(C).
•• See I.R.C. § 7872(a)-(b),(e).
•• See I.R.C. § 7872 (a)-(b).
•• See I.R.C. § 7872(a)-(b). For example, if the applicable federal rate were 10%, the present value of a six year, $10,000 loan would be $5,640.' Thus, the initial unrelated payment
would be $4,360. If the $10,000 were repaid at maturity, out of that amount $4,360 would be
treated as interest. In this example and all examples used in this article, present value is
determined by compounding annually. Under§ 7872, however, compounding must be semiannual.
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With the adoption of section 7872 in 1984, therefore, the bifurcation analysis that earlier had been employed by section 483 to distinguish interest from sale proceeds evolved into a definition of the
amount of a receipt that would be treated as a loan. 62 Indeed, in
the extension of the principles of section 483 that are presently
embodied in section 1274, the computation of the present values of
payments to be made is characterized as resulting in the "imputed
principal amount" of the deferred payment. 63 Thus, the process
begun in section 483 has today evolved into a congressionally
adopted bifurcation approach to the definition of debt.
III.
A.

THE CoRRECT DEFINITION oF DEBT

The Structure of I nco me Taxation: A Framework for
Analysis ·

A system of taxation consists of an array of sub-systems that
prescribe different rules for the taxation of different transactions.
For a correct burden of taxation to be achieved, transactions must
be assigned correctly to the sub-system that governs the taxation
of that form of transaction. Just as a personal residence will not be
taxed correctly if it is classified, for example, as a hospital, likewise
a loan will not be correctly taxed if it is classified as a form of
income. The most important sub-systems, for purposes of this article, are those that control the timing of the taxation of receipts
and those that specify the pattern for taxing debt and income.
The primary rules imposed by these sub-systems are well understood, even though their full implications frequently are not appreciated. Because an income tax is only imposed upon a gain or increase,64 the receipt of the proceeds of a loan is not taxable. 611 The
•• The first use of the bifurcation approach to define debt appeared in regulations proposed under § 385 which authorized the Treasury to issue regulations distinguishing between stock and debt. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-3(a), (b)(1)(ii) (1980). In an adaptation of
§ 483, the regulations limited the maximum amount of the investment characterizable as
debt to the present value of the repayment obligation of the ·purported debt security, rather
than the face amount of the security. The excess over that amount was classified as an
equity investment. While that regulation was ultimately withdrawn, its bifurcation analysis
was subsequently codified in § 7872 and in the extension of § 483 contained in § 1274.
•• See I.R.C. § ·1274(b)(1) .
.. The classic theoretical definition of income is the sum of the taxpayer's consumption
and net change in wealth between two points in time. See, e.g., Simons, Personal Income
Taxation, p. 50 (1938).
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receipt is offset by the obligation to repay the loan and thus the
transaction does not result in gain. What "obligation to repay"
means is, of course, the main focus of this article. Similarly, to the
extent that the repayment of a loan is regarded as the mere return
of the original amount borrowed, the repayment does not produce
income tax consequences. 66 However, to the extent that the payment is treated as a payment of interest to compensate the lender
for the· use of the loan proceeds, then it is deductible (subject, of
course, to an increasing list of exceptions). 67
On the other hand, if the proceeds of a loan are in fact not repaid by the borrower, the transaction will result in an increase in
net worth and· that gain will become taxable at the time the offsetting liability is discharged. 68 For income tax purposes, the transaction is viewed as if the borrower first obtained an economic receipt
equal to the amount of the indebtedness forgiven, and then later
used that (constructive). receipt to repay the loan. 69 The income
tax consequences of this constructive receipt and qisbursement
parallel the consequences of an actual receipt and disbursement.
Thus, the receipt will be taxable only if an actual receipt would
have been taxable. 70 Meanwhile, the disbursement will have no tax
consequences to the extent it constitutes a repayment of principal,
although it may be deductible if it represents a payment of
interest. 71
·
By contrast, if a receipt is treated as taxable income when received, because the existence of an offsetting obligation was unknown or disregarded, the receipt will be subject to immediate tax•• See generally Popkin, supra note 2, at 43.
" See Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1409, 1413-1414 (9th Cir. 1986).
•• The deduction is generally allowed by § 163(a), buti it is subject to numerous limitations. These include § 265(a)(2) (allocable to tax-exempt income), § 163(d) (investment in,
terest), and § 163(h) (personal interest).
88
See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1931); Treas. Reg.§ 1.61-12(a).
•• See United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938); Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.
223, 236 (1977).
•• If, for example, the cancellation is a gift, no tax is imposed. See Helvering v. American
Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330 (1943).
71
See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1947). Under current law this result is
achieved by not taxing the cancellation of a liability, the payment of which would be deductible. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(2). The net effect of this provision is the same as if the income
were taxed, but the constructive payment of the liability deducted. Compare I.R.C
§ 108(e)(2) with I.R.C. § 357(c)(3)(A)(i) and Coven, Liabilities in Excess of Basis: Focht,
Section 357(c)(3) and the Assignment of Income, 58 Or. L. Rev 61, 66-67 (1979).
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ation. However, if the previously taxed receipt actually must be
repaid, that repayment will be deductible when made. 72
These primary rules for the sub-systems governing the taxation
of debt and income can thus be seen to be rules of timing as much
as they are rules of inclusion or exclusion. If the receipt is retained,
the borrower ultimately will be subject to tax on the amount of the
receipt, regardless of how the receipt was initially treated. If the
receipt is not retained, the borrower will not be taxed on that
amount, again, regardless of the initial treatment. Thus, the net
effect of the initial assignment of a transaction to the sub-system
for taxing debt or the sub-system for taxing income is not to include or exclude a receipt from income, but rather to control the
timing of when increases in wealth are taxed.
While the primary impact of the sub-system assignment of a
transaction may be upon the timing of a receipt's taxation, that
assignment nonetheless will have a material effect upon the overall
burden of taxation imposed. The significance of that timing effect,
and thus the propriety of assigning a transaction to the sub-system
for taxing debt or income, is best seen through illustration. 73
CASE ONE
Abbie, a key employee of Distributor, Inc., has obtained a $10,000
loan from Distributor, giving in exchange her personal note. The
note matures in six years and bears interest at a market rate of
10o/~, payable annually. However, at Abbie's option, the note can at
any time be applied to reduce outstanding accounts receivable due
Abbie for the Distributor's purchase of goods from her. Both Abbie
and Distributor are subject to a marginal rate of tax of 30%, and
both can earn a 10% pre-tax return on their investments.

Under current law, of course, this transaction would be governed
by the bifurcation approach of section 7872. 74 Absent that section,
however, the consequences of the transaction would be controlled
by the definition of debt employed by the Supreme Court. Because
See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951); I.R.C. § 1341; Dubroff, The Claim of
Right Doctrine, 40 Tax L. Rev. 729, 747-55 (1985).
78
Note that this case illustration, along with others that appear later on, can also be
found in an appendix to this article. This is provided so as to facilitate cross-referencing in
passages that demand a review of the case descriptions.
74
See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B). Section 7872 also contains a series of de minimis exceptions
to its application that are ignored herein. See I.R.C. §§ 7872(c)(2), (c)(3), (d)(1).
71
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of Abbie's control over the principal of the receipt, under the latter
approach the receipt might be treated as income when Abbie receives it, notwithstanding the market rate of interest paid by Abbie while the note remained outstanding. It is important to understand exactly why this characterization of the transaction would
produce an incorrect result.
Because the repayment obligation bears a market rate of interest,711 the present value of the obligation is equal to the amount of
the receipt. 76 Accordingly, Abbie's transaction has not produced an
economic gain and, under the principles of income taxation, should
not be subject to tax, at least not in year 1. That result is achieved
by fully recognizing her repayment obligation in year 1, and thus
assigning the receipt to the sub-system for taxing debt.
The importance of not taxing Abbie on her receipt (that is, on
an amount greater than her actual increase in net worth) can be
demonstrated by an examination of the after-tax economic consequences of the transaction. If Abbie reinvests the receipt, obtaining
a market rate of return, and ultimately repays the loan, the overall
transaction will produce neither a net gain nor a loss; Abbie will
return or pay over to the lender principal and interest precisely
equal to the amount she receives. Since the transaction does not
change her economic position, there is simply no occasion for the
imposition of tax. Accordingly, no net income tax burden should be
imposed upon the transaction. Such a result is achieved under the
pattern of taxation applicable to debt. In this situation, neither the
receipt nor the repayment of the receipt has any income tax consequences, and the deductions for the payment of interest will offset
the tax imposed upon the return that derived from investing the
receipt..
Conversely, under the pattern for taxing income, an economic
receipt is immediately taxed in full. Had Abbie simply received
compensation in the amount of $10,000, for example, she would
have been subject to a tax of $3,000 and thus would only be able to
reinvest the $7,000 in after-tax proceeds of the receipt. Since the
The analysis in this section ignores the impact that the likelihood of repayment may
have upon the current taxation of the receipt. That issue is addressed in the text accompanying notes 126-44 but does not alter the conclusions reached here.
78
See Canellos & Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest Deferral and
Discount After 1982, 38 Tax L. Rev. 565, 572-74 (1983).
70
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receipt would not be offset by a repayment obligation (including
any obligation to pay interest), Abbie would retain the entire return generated by the reinvestment of her after-tax proceeds. That
return, however, would be subject to income taxation. Under the
sub-system for taxing income, both the initial receipt and the income generated by the investment of the receipt are subject to tax.
As a result, after six years Abbie's after-tax income would have
increased to $10,500.
The pattern of income taxation that Abbie's case exemplifies has
sometimes been referred to as the "double taxation" of income
from capital, a phenomenon that has been characterized as defective in principle. 77 Whether this is an accurate assessment is not
presently i:J;Ilportant. Defective or not, the immediate taxation of
receipts and the income generated therefrom is a fundamental
characteristic of income taxation and thus constitutes the "ideal"
burden of an income tax. To the extent that the taxation of the
initial receipt is deferred, or the income derived from the investment of the receipt untaxed, this normal burden of the income tax
is avoided and the transaction is subsidized. 78
In Case One, however, subjecting Abbie's receipt to this sub-system for taxing income, as might occur under the judicial approach
to debt, would produce an incorrect result. If a tax were imposed
on the receipt of the $10,000 loan, Abbie· would only be able to

•• See Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 370, 370-74 (1979), for a
discussion of the issue and a collection of authorities.
The primary consequence of the "double" taxation of investments is that, over time, the
effective rate of tax on an investment will be greater than the nominal rate of tax. Assume,
for example, a world without taxation in which a taxpayer receives $1,000 of compensation
at the end of year 0 that can be invested at a 10% return. After two years this investment
would grow to $1,210. It might be supposed that, following the introduction of a 30% tax, a
taxpayer (assuming no change in interest rates) should be left with 70% of $1,210, or $847.
Under the existing structure of the income tax, however, that is not the correct result. The
initial receipt would be subject to tax which would only allow the investment of $700. Since
the return on that investment would also be subject to current taxation, that amount would
grow at a 7% after-tax rate of return and thus would produce only $801 after two years.
Under other systems of taxation, this effective increase in the nominal rate of tax can be
avoided. In particular, under a consumption tax, the salary and the return from the investment of the salary would not be subject to tax until it was withdrawn from investment and
consumed. Thus, after two years the taxpayer would have accumulated $1,210. Subjecting
that amount to a 30% tax at the end of year 2 would, of course, preserve the nominal rate of
tax on the overall transaction.
•• For a careful description of the resulting subsidy, see Johnson, Soft Money Investing
Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1019 (1989).

1991]

Redefining Debt

605

invest, and thus earn a return, on the after-tax proceeds of the
receipt. At a 30% tax rate, Abbie would only be able to invest
$7,000 and thus would derive a pre-tax annual return of $700.
However, she still would be required to pay interest to Distributor
on the full $10,000. As a result, Abbie would be required to pay out
$1,000 in interest annually - $300 more than she was able to
earn. 79 The imposition of an immediate tax on the proceeds of the
loan would convert a transaction that had previously been economically neutral into one generating an after-tax economic loss. 80
That result, so fundamentally inconsistent with the goal of taxing
only gains in wealth, would be plainly incorrect.
This initial overtaxation of Abbie will not be corrected by permitting her to deduct 'the repayment of the $10,000 in year 6; All
other things remaining equal, the tax benefit from that deduction
will precisely offset the amount of the tax burden imposed upon
her in year 1. 81 However, that benefit will not adequately compensate Abbie for the premature imposition of tax. The deduction in
year 6 will not reverse the harm that Abbie suffered as a consequence of losing the opportunity to invest an amount equal to the
tax paid in year 1 over the six year period that the transaction
remained open. Thus, even though her transaction was economically neutral prior to taxation, Abbie will still suffer an after-tax
loss. 5 2
The fundamental error in taxing Abbie's receipt thus becomes
•• Of course, if the borrower reinvests the proceeds at a different rate of return than the
interest rate charged by the lender, the borrower will obtain an economic gain, or loss. That
profit or loss, attributable to the management of the funds by the borrower, will produce
taxable income or loss. Thus, any economic changes experienced by the borrower will be
reflected in his income tax.
•• Under some circumstances, the improper tax burden resulting from the imposition of
this tax could be offset by extending to the lender an immediate deduction in the amount of
the loan. The resulting tax benefit to the lender might then eliminate the burden on the
borrower, viewing the parties together. Such "surrogate" taxation is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 155-57. The possibility of this "two wrongs can make a right" approach
to taxation does not detract from the text's conclusion that taxing the borrower is improper.
11
That is, the $3,000 reduction in her tax liability produced by deducting the repayment
will equal the $3,000 tax imposed upon the receipt.
•• The detriment to Abbie can be expressed differently. The present value of the tax
benefit in year 6, discounted over the six years of the transaction, will be significantly less
than the immediate burden of the tax in year 1. The difference between the present value of
the tax benefit and the nominal value of the tax burden represents the present value of the
income that could be earned investing an amount equal to the tax paid. It thus equals the
present value of the loss sustained by Abbie.
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apparent from an examination of the income generated by the reinvestment of the receipt. Imposing a tax on the receipt is erroneous not merely because the tax would violate an abstract principle
barring taxation in the absence of, or in advance of, an accretion to
wealth. Rather, taxation is improper because the imposition of tax
would deprive the taxpayer of the ability to fund the obligation to
make payments of interest on the offsetting liability. Since that
deprivation is inconsistent with the very concept of income taxation, the imposition of tax is improper. The critically important
corollary to this observation, developed below, is that taxing Abbie's receipt is not improper merely because the receipt was offset
by a repayment obligation; the repayment of that obligation was
fully funded by the deduction available in year 6.
It remains to be considered, of course, whether these conclusions
would be altered if Abbie in fact failed to repay the receipt. That
possibility appears to be a substantial factor in the test applied by
the Supreme Court in Indianapolis Power, with its focus upon the
borrower's control over repayment. 83 An analysis of the conversion
of loan proceeds to retained income, and of the tax imposed at that
time, appears below. Assuming for the moment, however, that the
transaction is concluded in accordance with its terms, it seems improper to impose tax on a receipt during the period that the receipt is offset by a repayment obligation bearing a market rate of
interest.
Analysis of the simplest case of receipts that are offset by obligations of equivalent value demonstrates, at least in one context, that
the definition of debt employed by the Supreme Court is inadequate. To secure a correct burden of tax on Abbie's transaction,
her receipt must not be subject to tax. Under our income tax system, that result should be achieved by recognizing the repayment
obligation and classifying her receipt as the proceeds of a loan.
Under the judicial definition of debt, however, that classification is
not assured. In Indianapolis Power, the borrower's control over repayment was deemed far more significant than the interest rate,
and this suggests that the repayment obligation might be ignored
and the receipt currently taxed. However, as Case One illustrates,
that result would be incorrect as long as Abbie in fact pays a market rate of interest.
•• See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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Non-Interest Bearing Repayment Obligations

The impropriety of imposing a current tax upon a receipt offset
by a repayment obligation bearing a market rate of interest would
not be controversial were it not for the doubt repeatedly cast upon
that principle by the Supreme Court. 8• Similarly, the taxation of
receipts that are not offset by any repayment obligation - while
not alway~ followed in practice - is really not debated in principle.811 Rather, what has proven to be surprisingly elusive is determing the proper taxation of receipts that are offset by a non-interest
bearing repayment obligation.
CASE TWO
Like Abbie, Bob is employed by Distributor and obtains a $10,000
loan from his employer. The note given by Bob in exchange for the
loan also matures in six years but does not bear any stated interest.
Bob is also subject to a marginal tax rate of 30% and can earn a
10% pre-tax return on his investments.

With the tools available under present law, there are three possible income tax consequences of such a transaction to Bob. Under
the judicial approach to debt, the receipt might be (1) entirely excluded from income, by respecting the parties' characterization of
the transaction; or (2) entirely included in income, by recharacterizing the receipt as disguised compensation. The third possible
outcome would involve the bifurcation of the receipt as required by
section 7872. In fact, under current law section 7872 would preempt the judicial approach and the transaction would be bifurcated. Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the consequences
of applying the Supreme Court's "ali-or-nothing" approach.

1.

The Judicial Approach

Under the decision in Indianapolis Power, Bob's receipt might
very well be excluded from his income because it constituted the
proceeds of a loan. His receipt is offset by an unconditional obligation to repay the entire amount borrowed. Under the Court's reasoning, the absence of stated interest eppears to be of little rele.. See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
•• See Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1019.
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vance. However, unli~e Abbie's receipt, Bob's receipt is not offset
by an obligation of equivalent value. Because his obligation is noninterest bearing, the value of that obligation to Distributor will be
considerably less than the nominal principal amount of the obligation. In fact, the value of the obligation will be equal to the present
value of the repayment obligation, discounted at Bob's after-tax
interest rate. That is, the actual present burden of the obligation is
equal to the funds that Bob would be required to invest today to
produce $10,000 in six years, after reinvesting the after-tax return
on that amount. 86 That figure, $10,000 discounted over six years at
7%, presently would be only $6,667. Accordingly, at the time of the
initial receipt, Bob derived an increase in net worth equal to the
amount by which the actual receipt of $10,000 exceeded the present value of the repayment obligation of $6,667. Bob, therefore,
realized a gain of $3,333 at the time of the initial receipt.
Just as it would have been incorrect to tax Abbie in the absence
of an increase in her wealth, it is necessary to impose an immediate
tax on Bob's increase in wealth. The failure to do so would result
in the material undertaxation of his transaction relative to Abbie's.
In principle, the impropriety of not taxing Bob's increase in wealth
· at the time it occurs, and the magnitude of that impropriety, is
well understood. The failure to currently tax an economic receipt
that produces an accretion to wealth is equivalent to exempting
from tax the income earned from investing that receipt. 87 That relationship can best be seen by comparing the results of a single
year under the alternative treatments, as shown by the· table below. Under the first regime, corresponding to the correct application of the sub-system for taxing income, the receipt is fully taxed
but deducted at the end of the period. Under the second, corresponding to the failure to tax Bob's $3,333 increase in wealth, the
receipt is not taxed until the end of the period.

•• Because the repayment of the $10,000 principal amount of the loan to Bob would not
be deductible to any extent, an accumulation of the full $10,000 would be required to repay
the loan.
87

See Fellows, supra note 1, at 732-33.
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Receipt
Tax
Net to Invest
10% Return
Tax at 30%
Net Return
Net Amount
Tax
Total
Preference

INCOME TAXED
$3,333
1,000
2,333
233"

(70)
163

609
TAX DEFERRED
$3,333
0
3,333
333
(100)
233

2,496
(0)
2,496

3,566
(1,000)
2,566
70

The highlighted figures reveal that the after-tax investment return derived from investing the pre-tax proceeds of the receipt
($233) is equal to the pre-tax investment return derived from investing the after-tax proceeds ($233). Therefore, it may be observed that the overall economic effect of not taxing an economic
receipt is equivalent to not taxing the income produced by the receipt. Accordingly, to the extent that Bob's increase in wealth is
not taxed, he would obtain a tax preference. This preference would
be equivalent to exempting from tax the income derived from investing the $3,333 increase in wealth over the period that the
transaction remained open. Under an income tax, it simply is
wrong not to tax either a receipt that produces an economic gain or
the income from investing that receipt. When the transaction remains open for a long period of time, that improper benefit, or tax
subsidy, can be quite substantial.
While a proper burden of taxation could be achieved by subjecting Bob to a current tax on his $3,333 gain at the time of the initial
receipt, an identical result can be obtained in an easier fashion.
The same burden of taxation would be achieved by taxing the entire amount of the non-interest bearing receipt when received, and
permitting a deduction for the repayment of that amount when
paid. Thus, immediate taxation of the entire receipt would burden
Bob with a $3,000 tax (30% of the $10,000 receipt). However, deducting that same amount in year 6, when the receipt is actually
repaid, would produce a tax benefit with a present value of $2,000
. (after being discounted at Bob's after-tax rate of interest). Accord'ingly, in present value terms, the net burden of tax imposed upon
the overall transaction would be $1,000. On the other hand, impos-
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ing an immediate tax on Bob's initial gain of $3,333 would result in
an identical $1,000 net tax burden.
Because of this relationship, a proper burden of taxation can be
imposed upon Bob without incurring the complexity of computing
the present value of, or ascertaining the actual maturity of, the repayment obligation. A proper tax burden will be achieved if a noninterest bearing receipt is subject to immediate taxation, provided
that a deduction is allowed for the entire amount of the repayment, if and when made. Subjecting Bob to current taxation on the
entire $10,000 amount of the receipt initially might have appeared
to produce an improper result because Bob would be taxed on an
amount greater than his $3,333 actual increase in net worth. However, because the combination of a current tax and a deferred deduction produces the same result as the current taxation of the
actual increase in wealth, a correct burden is in fact achieved.
Subjecting Bob's receipt to immediate taxation in full, notwithstanding the existence of a non-interest bearing repayment obligation, is the result that would be achieved under the judicial definition of debt if Bob's repayment obligation were wholly
disregarded. Ignoring that obligation would result in the characterization of the receipt as disguised compensation and the assignment of the receipt to the sub-system for taxing income. As in the
analysis of Abbie's case, the propriety of that result can most readily be observed from an examination of the economic consequences
of investing the receipt.
What distinguishes Bob's receipt from Abbie's, of course, is that
he does not have the economic burden of paying interest on the
receipt. In Abbie~s case, that burden required the deferral of tax on
the receipt to allow her to fund the obligation to pay interest. In
Bob's case, that justification for assigning his receipt to the subsystem for taxing debt is wholly lacking. Accordingly, if Bob's receipt is to be treated as the proceeds of a loan, that result must be
justified by the existence of the non-interest bearing repayment
obligation itself. However, the mere presence of a non-interest
bearing repayment obligation does not justify the deferral of tax
upon a receipt.
If Bob's $10,000 receipt were taxed when it was obtained, he
would be left with only the $7,000 after-tax proceeds of the receipt.
Upon the investment of that amount, those proceeds would grow
at an after-tax rate of return to $10,500 over the six year maturity
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of the loan. However, if Bob were then required to return the initial receipt, he would obtain a tax benefit of $3,000 upon the deduction of the $10,000 payment. The after-tax burden of the repayment would then be $7,000. Accordingly, Bob would be able to
return the entire principal amount of the receipt, while retaining
the full $3,500 after-tax profit from investing the receipt for six
years. Thus, if a repayment obligation is ultimately honored, the
taxpayer will be fully compensated for the initial taxation of the
receipt by the deduction obtained for the full amount of that repayment in the year in which it occurs. Accordingly, the mere existence of Bob's repayment obligation does not justify the deferral of
the taxation of his receipt.
The net result of taxing the initial receipt, and granting a deduction for the repayment, is simply to limit Bob's investment over
the six years to the after-tax proceeds of his receipt, while permitting the retention of the entire after-tax return on that investment.
This result, of course, corresponds precisely to the burden of taxation imposed by the sub-system for taxing income. Indeed, the
$3,500 after:tax profit that Bob would retain under this pattern of
taxation represents the after-tax yield on the six-year investment
of the $10,000 receipt.
Imposing a current tax on Bob's receipt thus leaves Bob in the
same economic position as one who derived a $10,000 itein of fully
taxable income for the six years over which Bob retained his receipt. That result is entirely sound. Bob obtained an interest-free
receipt, and thus was entitled to retain the full amount of the after-tax return from investing the receipt. Since Bob obtained the
economic benefit of the receipt of income while the transaction remained open, subjecting his transaction to the sub-system for taxing income is entirely appropriate.
On the other hand,, treating Bob's receipt as the proceeds of a
loan is unjustifiable and produces an incorrect result. Under the
sub-system for taxing debt, Bob would be able to inve.st the entire
$10,000 pre-tax receipt. Because he is not obligated to pay interest
on that receipt, he would retain the entire after-tax return on that
investment. Thus, at the end of six years, Bob's investment would
have grown to $15,000. Upon the discharge of his repayment obligation, which would not have income tax consequences, Bob would
retain an after-tax profit of $5,000 on his transaction. This is
$1,500 more profit than the $3,500 profit that Bob would derive
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under the sub-system for taxing income. This additional profit represents Bob's return on a six-year investment of an amount equal
to the $3,000 tax payable on his receipt, under the sub-system for
taxing income. Thus, it reflects the value of the deferral of that
tax.
Under this pattern of taxation, Bob would avoid one of the levels
of tax imposed by the sub-system for taxing income, even though
he obtains the economic benefits of the receipt of income. As a
result, Bob would have obtained the benefits of deferring taxation
of his receipt (as extended by the sub-system for taxing debt), even
though he was not subject to the economic burdens that would justify such a deferral. Accordingly, Bob would have achieved an after-tax result more favorable than that extended by a proper application of either the sub-system for taxing income or the subsystem for taxing debt. That benefit would constitute a significant
and unwarranted tax preference.
The broader principle that emerges from this comparison of
Bob's transaction with Abbie's is that the justification for the
deferral of tax provided by the sub-system for taxing debt lies not
in the repayment obligation itself, but rather in the obligation to
pay a market rate of interest on that obligation. Absent the economic burden created by that interest expense, the justification for
the deferral of tax disappears. Instead of resulting in a correct allocation of tax liabilities, applying the sub-system for taxing debt to
a receipt that is offset by a non-interest bearing obligation results
in the material undertaxation of the recipient. Therefore, the judicial approach to debt errs to the extent that it would recognize the
full principal amount of a non-interest bearing repayment obligation as offsetting the tax otherwise applicable to a receipt.
Whether any portion of such a receipt should be recognized as
"debt" depends upon the propriety of the congressional approach
to debt.

2.

The Section 7872 Approach

The other approach to the taxation of Bob's receipt under current law would be the bifurcation approach of section 7872. Under
section 7872, the transaction is wholly reconstructed and treated as
if Bob received a discounted loan bearing interest at the market
rate of 10%, as well as an amount of taxable compensation. The
non-taxable principal amount of the discounted loan is quite prop-
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erly computed by discounting the nominal amount of the repayment obligation of $10,000 by a pre-tax interest rate to determine
the amount of interest that would in fact be paid at the maturity
of such a loan. Under that approach, Bob would be treated as receiving a discounted loan in the amount of $5,640 that ultimately
would require the payment of $4,360 in interest. In addition, Bob
would be treated as receiving immediately taxable income of
$4,360. The taxation of the discounted loan would be controlled by
the usua:l rules of the Code governing discounted interest. Thus,
Bob would be entitled to accrue an annual interest deduction, 88
computed under compound interest principles, that would equal
the income that could be earned by investing the loan's $5,640 proceeds at the same rate of interest. Because of that deduction, the
$5,640 will increase at Bob's pre-tax rate of return and in six years
will equal the $10,000 required to repay the receipt.
If Bob had in fact received compensation of $4,360 and a discounted loan of $5,640, the overall burden of taxation imposed by
·section 7872 would clearly be correct. However, that is not what
Bob received, and the section 7872 result is incorrect. 89 The analogy to the receipt of a discounted loan plus an unrelated payment
is false, and results in the material undertaxation of the recipients
of interest-free receipts.
Under section 7872, taxpayers are treated as the recipients of
discounted loans because that reconstruction is thought to be the
most accurate reflection of the borrower's theoretical income.
Working backwards from the amount the borrower is obligated to
. repay, the pre-tax present value of the repayment obligation
clearly represents the principal amount of the loan that could have
been obtained for that repayment, on the maturity date, and at the
assumed rate of interest. Accordingly, it is concluded, that computed amount represents the market value of the repayment obligation and is thus the portion of the receipt that does not re•• I.R.C. § 163(e) (1988).
•• It is not surprising that there are different ways of recharacterizing, and thus taxing, an
interest-free receipt. A non-interest bearing "loan" does not reflect commercial reality and
thus must be reconstructed to bring the transaction into conformity with its economic substance. Not uncommonly under the tax laws, in such a situation there will be two or more
competing potential characterizations, each having different income tax consequences. See
Levmore, Recharacterizations and the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law, 136 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1019 (1988).
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present a gain. As such, it should not be subject to tax.
The fallacy in this justification for the section 7872 approach is
that the recipient of an interest-free loan is not in the same legal
or economic position as the borrower on a discounted loan, and
thus the reconstruction does not reflect the market value of the
repayment obligation. Had Bob in fact received a discounted loan
of $5,640, the lending Distributor would be entitled to be repaid
that amount, free of tax, plus interest of $4,360, which would be
fully taxable. Because that interest would be taxed as it accrued,
Distributor's investment in Bob would grow at an after-tax rate of
interest, as would any other normally taxed investment. Thus,
upon repayment in full, Distributor would be left with $8,460 after
the payment of all taxes, not $10,000. For that reason, a true discounted loan may be terminated at any time, without prejudice to
either party, for a payment of the original amount loaned plus interest accrued to that date. Assuming that Distributor could reinvest that amount at the same return, the investment would continue to grow at an after-tax rate of interest and would produce
$8,460 by the end of year 6.
The maker of an interest-free loan, however, is entitled to receive $10,000 at the end of year 6 free of all taxes. Accordingly, to
terminate the transaction without prejudice would require that
Bob pay Distributor an amount that would grow, after taxes had
been paid currently on the return from that amount, to $10,000not merely $8,460. That is, Bob would be required to pay an
amount equal to $10,000, discounted to the date of termination at
an after-tax rate of interest. As seen above, 90 on the date of the
receipt that amount would be $6,667, not $5,640.
In fact, therefore, Bob is not in the same position as if he had
received a discounted loan. The legal and economic relationships
established by an interest-free loan are quite different from the
relationships established by the receipt of an interest-bearing, discounted loan. It follows that the approach of section 7872 cannot
be justified by analogy to a discounted loan.
Indeed, the result reached under section 7872 cannot be justified
at all; as shown above, the correct amount for which Bob should be
taxed in year 1 is $3,333, not $4,360. Moreover, after excluding the
$6,667 from income in year 1, Bob should not be entitled to any
•• See supra text accompanying note 86.
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further tax benefit from the repayment of the receipt, because the
exclusion would fully compensate Bob for the burden of the repayment obligation. Thus, Bob may set that $6,667 aside 91 and in year
6, after accumulating the after-tax return on that amount, he
would have the $10,000 required to repay the receipt. Section 7872
is therefore in error in two related respects: the recipient is overtaxed upon the commencement of the transaction, while in future
years the recipient is undertaxed by the amount of the deductions
allowed for the artificially created interest. As shall be seen, the
net effect of section 7872 is to materially undertax the recipients of
interest-free receipts.
The attempt to justify section 7872 by analogy to a discounted
loan is simply circular. Computing the present value of the repayment obligation using a pre-tax rate of interest would be correct
only if the obligor were entitled to interest deductions that would
offset the income produced by investing the receipt, thereby allowing the investment to grow free of tax (that is, at the pre-tax
rate). However, the obligor would only be entitled to those deductions if the transaction were reconstructed as an interest-bearing
loan. Thus, the analogy to a discounted loan is simply a restatement of the erroneous result produced by section 7872 .
. More importantly, perhaps, the burden of taxation imposed on
Bob by section 7872 is inconsistent with the principles of the subsystem for· taxing debt and the sub-system for taxing income. It
was observed above that the failure to impose any current tax on
Bob's receipt was incorrect, because it allowed Bob to earn and
retain a return on his temporary investment that was greater than
the $3,500 that would result from the proper application of the
sub-system for taxing income. Section 7872, however, produces
precisely the same preferential tax burden with respect to the portion of the receipt that remains untaxed. Thus, under that provision, Bob is entitled to retain an amount equal to the amount for
which he was initially subject to tax, plus the return thereon. After
six years, this would amount to $4,578 - a result that is too
favorable to the taxpayer. 92
•• Alternatively, Bob could transfer the same amount to the lender in year 1 and by year
6 the lender would have the same $10,000.
••. The reinvestment of the amount treated as a loan, increasing at a pre-tax rate of return, will be sufficient to repay the $10,000 after six years. The after-tax proceeds of the
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Under the reconstruction of the receipt required by section 7872,
the transaction is divided into two portions, only one of which is
taxed. Upon the conclusion of the transaction, ·the borrower will ·
have repaid an amount exactly equal to the amount of the initial
receipt. Of that repayment, the borrower will be entitled to a deduction equal to the portion of the receipt originally taxed. However, the borrower will not be entitled to deduct an amount equal
to the portion that was received without tax. Thus, ignoring the·
complex recharacterization mandated by section 7872, the taxpayer is treated as receiving two separate receipts, each of which is
offset by a non-interest bearing repayment obligation. One of these
receipts is subject to immediate taxation and thus is properly
taxed under the rules of the sub-system for taxing income. 93 However, the other receipt -while economically identical to the first
- is not properly taxed, but instead is granted the deferral benefits of the sub-system for taxing debt. Because this receipt is not
interest-bearing, however, it should not be entitled to . that
treatment.
As may be observed, the net effect of section 7872 is to extend to
one portion of the receipt exactly the same pattern of taxation as
would be extended to the entire receipt under a tax-free .application of the judicial approach. Section 7872 improves upon the judicial approach by imposing a partial tax, but fails to achieve a correct level of taxation for the overall transaction. The burden of
taxation imposed remains more favorable than the result that
would be achieved under either the sub-system for taxing debt or
the sub-system for taxing income.
The economic reality of Case Two is that Bob borrowed $10,000,
repaid the loan, and was able to retain all of the income generated
by his investment of the $10,000. Any reconstruction of that transaction that seeks to treat a portion of the receipt as offset by an
interest-bearing obligation cannot achieve a correct result, because
the repayment obligation is in reality not interest-bearing. Rather,
because Bob could retain the entire amount of income generated
amount treated as income, 70% of $4,360 or $3,052, would grow to $4,578, all of which Bob
would retain.
•• In fact, even 'the taxable portion of the receipt is treated too favorably. Because the
repayment of that portion of the receipt is treated as a payment of interest, Bob would be
entitled to accrue annual deductions aggregating that amount. In fact, Bob should not be
entitled to that deduction until repayment actually occurs.
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by his investment- thus obtaining the economic benefits of earning income during the six years the transaction remained open - a
correct tax result can only be achieved by subjecting the entire
amount of the receipt to current taxation.
Section 7872 is the result of a too casual extension of the principles of section 483 and the notion that any deferred payment necessarily contains an interest factor. 94 Under that view, since Bob's
receipt must contain interest, the receipt must be recast to reveal·
that interest factor and thus the "real" amount that was loaned.
The problem is that Bob's receipt did not contain interest and the
real amount on loan was the entire amount of the receipt. This
does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the receipt must
be recast to include interest. Rather, it should lead to the conclusion that the transaction should not be treated as a loan for income
tax purposes at all. Because Bob was not required to fund any obligation to pay interest, his entire receipt should be taxed under the
sub-system for taxing income. Bifurcation under section 483 is a
useful analytical tool for identifying the character of a gain realized by a taxpayer; the use of that tool to create interest, however,
produces an incorrect income tax result because it converts an element of income into a tax-exempt receipt.
The foregoing analysis of Case Two demonstrates that the recipients of interest-free receipts are not correctly taxed under the
congressional approach to debt embodied in section 7872. The creation-of-interest concept underlying that provision is simply erroneous. Interestingly, however, interest-free receipts might be correctly taxed under the aU-or-nothing judicial approach. Wholly
disregarding the repayment obligation and subjecting the entire
amount of the receipt to current taxation would produce the correct result. This would occur if time value of money principles
were used to determine whether an obligation should be respected
or ignored, rather than used to bifurcate a single transaction. 911
.. See Lokken, supra note 1, at 11 (describing this notion as the "first premise" of the
time value of money).
•• While the undertaxation of receipts should not be tolerated when a likelihood exists
that the payment will not be deductible, it is not at all clear that the overtaxation of a
receipt would be equally offensive to sound income tax policy. Advocates of the bifurcation
approach would regard the full inclusion of an interest-free receipt in income as overtaxation of borrowers, notwithstanding the arguments to the contrary made herein. However,
that result lies within the control of the parties.
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Our analysis of section 7872 suggests several further conclusions
regarding the kind of repayment obligations that should be recognized for income tax purposes. Plainly, receipts should only be
treated as the proceeds of a loan to the extent they are offset by
repayment obligations that bear a market rate of interest. Moreover, for the purpose of computing that rate of interest, only actual
interest stated by the parties should be taken into account. Fictitious interest does not support the recognition of repayment obligations. Accordingly, for income tax purposes, the definition of
debt should be limited to receipts that are offset by repayment obligations that bear stated interest at a market rate.

IV.

EXTENDING THE ANALYSIS

While the primary significance of the sub-system for taxing debt
lies in the treatment of conventional loans, the rules of that subsystem are applicable to a far broader range of transactions.
Throughout the history of the income tax, taxpayers have sought
to exclude from income receipts that were either subject to various
fixed or contingent obligations to repay, or that forced the taxpayer to incur analogous costs in the future. In some cases, they
have prevailed. Indianapolis Power, for example, involved cash deposits to secure the customer's obligation to make future payments
for services. 96 The decision not to impose a tax on the receipt when
received essentially involved a decision to subject the deposit to
the pattern of taxation applicable to debt. Similarly, in American
Automobile Ass'n v. United States 97 the taxpayer sought to escape
the current taxation of payments for services to be rendered in fuThe parties to the kinds of transfers considered in this article will always be able to secure
a proper pattern for taxing their transaction by charging a commercially reasonable rate of
interest. If the parties choose to proceed in a different manner, the fact that their transaction may be overtaxed does not seem to be of particular importance. In effect, the parties
have chosen to accept a heavier pattern of taxation as the price for engaging in a transaction
that does not conform to a standard of commercial reasonableness. That burden of taxation,
therefore, cannot be viewed as unfair in any important sense. Accordingly, in the present
context, if a choice must be made between the undertaxation or the overtaxation of receipts,
the overtaxation of the recipient would represent far sounder income tax policy.
" See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also City Gas Co. of Florida v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1982). Compare Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner,
128 F.2d 968, 970 (5th Cir. 1942) (rent deposit was not taxable income) with Gilken Corp. v.
Commissioner, 176 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1949) (rent deposit was taxable income) .
.. 367 u.s. 687 (1961).
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ture years. Had the taxpayer prevailed, the receipt would have
been taxed under the sub-system for taxing debt. 98 Since the pattern for taxing traditional loans has neve·r been questioned,99 most
judicial decisions defining the type of transactions subject to the
sub-system for taxing debt have involved such quasi-loan
transactions.
Moreover, while the sub-system for taxing debt normally is
viewed in its role of excluding a receipt from income, it also controls the timing of deductions. Since the effect of a deduction is
merely to shelter an equivalent amount of income from tax, the
effect of applying the sub-system to an expenditure is identical to
its application to a receipt. For example, in Mooney Aircraft, Inc.
v. United States 100 the taxpayer, a seller of aircraft, issued a
"Mooney Bond" in the principal amount of $1,000 to each purchaser of an aircraft. 101 The bond would be redeemed by the taxpayer upon the permanent retirement of the aircraft from service.102 The taxpayer sought to deduct from income the face
amount of the Mooney Bonds in the year of sale. 103 Had that position been sustaine.d, the taxpayer would have avoided tax on
$1,000 of otherwise taxable income, and the receipt would have
been taxed under the sub-system for taxing debt.
Paralleling the judicial approach to the definition of debt in the
context of conventional loans, the courts have not analyzed these
tax deferral claims by reference to economic consequences. Nevertheless, when deferral is extended, the effect is to extend to these
transactions the pattern of taxation used in the sub-system for taxing debt, not income. Because the deferral of tax on a receipt whether achieved by an exclusion or a deduction - has the effect
•• Of course, that result would not be reached by characterizing the receipt as debt. For
example, the legal issue presented in American Automobile was whether the Commissioner's
authority to require the use of an accounting method that clearly reflected income could
prevail over the requirements of the accrual method of accounting. See American Automobile, 367 U.S. at 690-92. In any such situation, the receipt will be subject either to the subsystem for taxing debt or the sub-system for taXing income.
" Even fully non-recourse debt is in general subject to the sub-system for taxing debt,
although that treatment is sometimes controversial and has to some extent been altered by
statute. See I.R.C. § 465 (tax deductions limited to amount at risk).
100
420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969).
101
Id. at 402.
101 ld.
1os Id.
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of treating the receipt as if it were the proceeds of a loan, the principles developed above for determining when such treatment is appropriate are equally applicable to the classification of all such
receipts.
A.

Advance Payments

In Case Two, Bob's receipt could have been a payment by the
Distributor to Bob for goods to be delivered in year 6. Notwithstanding that modification of the facts of Case Two, however,
Bob's economic position would remain unchanged. He would be in
possession of a $10,000 receipt that must be returned in year 6,
albeit through the delivery of goods in kind rather than the repayment of cash. Bob might then seek to defer the taxation of that
receipt to the year in which the amount of the receipt was earned
by the delivery of the goods. 104 Alternatively, Bob might seek to
offset the income generated by the receipt in year 1 by the amount
of the costs that he would incur in fulfilling his obligati·on to deliver goods in year 6. 106 In either event, should Bob prevail, the
timing of the taxation of the receipt would be governed by the
rules of the sub-system for taxing debt. That is, no tax would be
imposed upon the receipt when received; rather, a tax would only
be imposed later, when the receipt was no longer returnable and
thus was converted to taxable income.
Because this transaction's economic effect would be identical to
the economic effect of the receipt of loan proceeds, whether the
deferral of tax on such an advance payment will produce a correct
· income tax burden on the receipt must be determined by the same
principles that control the taxation of conventional loans. Thus, if
the recipient is not required to pay interest on the advance payment, the failure to impose a full tax at the time the receipt is first
obtained would result in the undertaxation of the recipient. Over
the six years in which the transaction remained open, the recipient
would be able to invest the pre-tax amount of the receipt, notwithstanding the fact that he was not required to pay any interest on
the receipt. As demonstrated above, this is simply an incorrect re104

This approach has been tried by taxpayers in a number of cases. See, e.g., Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1969); Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
••• See, e.g., Bell Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 158 (1965).
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suit. The reason for obtaining an interest-free receipt is completely
irrelevant to the economic effect of possessing the receipt, and thus
has no bearing on the proper timing for taxation of the receipt. 106
As in the original version of Case Two, because of the absence of
interest, the amount of the receipt exceeds the present value of the
obligation to deliver goods. This results in an immediate increase
in Bob's net worth that should be subject to tax. However, as derived above,. an equivalent and far more conveniently computed
burden of tax can be achieved by subjecting the entire amount of
the receipt to current taxation and allowing a deduction for the
ultimate repayment. 107 Thus, the full amount of a non-interest
bearing advance payment must be subject to tax upon receipt. 108
On the other hand, if interest is payable on the ·advance payment, the immediate taxation of the receipt would result in the
overtaxation of the recipient. The investment of the after-tax proceeds of the receipt would not yield a sufficient return to permit
the payment of a market rate of interest on the entire amount of
In practice, the taxation of advance payments has become ensnared in a variety of
accounting doctrines, including the requirements of accrual accounting and the desire to
reflect income and associated expenditures in the same period. See generally Malman,
Treatment of Prepaid Income- Clear Reflection of Income or Muddied Waters, 37 Tax L.
Rev. 103 (1981). It is, of course, legitimate to inquire as to what rule Congress has prescribed and whether this rule conforms to a theoretically correct outcome. The issue here,
however, is not what rule Congress has provided, but rather what rule would be correct in
principle. Concerns over accrual accounting and the matching of income and expense are
not relevant to this issue.
As in Case Two, taxing a receipt, while not allowing a deduction for the future costs of
earning the receipt, may appear to impose a tax on an amount greater than the actual increase in net worth (and thus mis-match income and expense). However, since taxing the
receipt when obtained, and allowing a deduction for costs as they are discharged, is
equivalent to taxing the excess of the receipt over the present value of the future obligation,
a correct burden of taxation in fact would be achieved:
107
.
Normally, an advance payment will not actually be repaid. This can be viewed two
ways. First, upon the delivery of the goods, the loan transaction could be viewed as closed
by the constructive repayment of the full amount of the loan, the proceeds of which would
be returned to the seller in payment for the goods. That repayment of the loan would generate a deduction that would be offset by. the receipt of the taxable proceeds of the sale.
Second, and more simply, the retention of the advance payment might be viewed as the
failure to repay the loan, in which event no tax deduction would be generated. Either view
produces the correct tax result.
108
Relatively few decisions have permitted the deferral of tax on advance payments. See
Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1367· (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867
(1976); Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968). It follows from the demonstration in the text that these decisions were incorrectly decided from the perspective of
sound income tax policy.
108
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the advance payment. Thus, as in Case One, the immediate taxation of an interest-bearing advance payment would improperly
convert an economically neutral transaction into one that produced an after-tax economic loss. Since that result is erroneous,
the imposition of tax must be deferred until interest is no longer
payable on the receipt. 109
While in principle the analysis of how to tax advance payments
is identical to the analysis of conventional loans, in practice the
taxation of advance payments raises nearly insoluble factual and
administrative issues. When a cash receipt must be repaid in cash,
any interest contained in the transaction will be evident. However,
when an advance payment in cash is received in exchange for the
future delivery of goods or services, it may be impossible to actually determine whether interest is payable on the advance. If so, it
becomes impossible to determine the correct pattern of taxing the
advance. In Case Two, for example, the $10,000 advance payment
would not be interest-bearing if Bob were to charge the same
$10,000 for the goods, regardless of whether payment was received
in year 1 or year 6. Conversely, the payment would be interestbearing if Bob were obligated to deliver, in year 6, goods that had a
value of $15,000. However, without independent evidence of the
value of the goods to be delivered, the existence of an interest factor in the transaction would be too difficult to establish in the routine administration of the taxing system.
Under section 483, the difficulties created by the lack of information regarding the taxation of deferred property payments are
resolved by deeming all such payments to contain an interest component.110 By first computing and taxing the interest element in
the transaction, section 483 renders the independent value of the
property sold irrelevant. While a similar approach could be taken
to advance payments, that approach would not produce an acceptable result. The foregoing analysis of conventional loans demonstrated that treating a portion of an otherwise non-interest bearing·
receipt as interest effectively exempts from tax the balance of the
receipt- and thus undertaxes the recipient. Just as the extension
of section 483 principles in section 7872 produced an incorrect re-

••• See Kiefer, The Tax Treatment of a 'Reverse Investment', 26 Tax Notes 925, 929
(1985).
110
See I.R.C. § 483(c).
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sult, the application of those principles to advance payments produces a similarly incorrect result. 111
If the sound administration of the taxing system precludes the
creation of interest in advance payments when the presence of actual interest is lacking or uncertain, the most appropriate method
for taxing such receipts follows a clear path. Unless the taxpayer is
able to demonstrate, clearly and convincingly, that retaining the
advance is contingent upon the delivery of goods ·having a value
that exceeds the advance by an amount at least equal to a market
rate of interest, the advance must be treated as non-interest bearing and thus s_ubject to immediate taxation in full. 112 The effect of
111
By contrast, the application of § 483 to deferred payments will protect revenues from
the manipulations of taxpayers entering into transactions that do not conform to commercial standards, principally by ensuring that interest is taxable to the seller at ordinary income rates.
In addition, for the transactions governed by § 483, the factual assumption that the
purchase price includes an interest factor is far more reasonable than would be the case with
advance payments. Nevertheless, in principle, sales of property for deferred payments
should be governed by the principles developed here, instead of being bifurcated. Thus, if
the value of the property is in fact equal to the amount of a non-interest bearing deferred
payment, interest should not be created. Instead, the tax benefits to the purchaser of the
property (e.g. depreciation), and the gain taxable to the seller, should be entirely deferred
until an actual payment is made.
111
When a taxpayer is able to demonstrate that an advance payment bears a market rate
of interest, a theoretically correct burden of taxation may be impossible to achieve. Analytically, such a transaction represents a loan from the buyer to the seller, maturing on the date
of delivery of the goods, and containing a discounted interest factor. Upon the delivery of
the goods, that loan is constructively repaid together with the discount interest. That full
amount is then returned by the buyer to the seller in payment for the goods delivered. Had
the transaction involved an actual loan, the receipt of the proceeds would not have been
subject to tax. While the loan was outstanding, the seller-borrower would have been entitled
tO accrue annual deductions for the discounted interest, which would have offset the tax
payable on the return generated by the investment of the advance. The repayment of the
loan would not have any income tax consequences, yet the receipt of the purchase price for
the goods would have been fully taxed.
To apply these concepts to an interest-bearing advance payment would thus require not
taxing the initial receipt, extending annual deductions to the seller during the years prior to
delivery, and subjecting the seller to tax in the year of delivery on an amount equal to the
sum of the initial receipt plus the annual deductions claimed. Moreover, the buyer would
obtain no deduction at the time of the initial payment, would be taxed annually on the
discounted interest income, and would obtain a deduction in the year of delivery for an
amount equal to the sum of the initial payment plus the income previously taxed to him.
While such a pattern of taxation is .theoretically correct, it would be intolerably complex
and utterly mystifying for both parties. It is clear that a simpler, if less accurate, solution is
required. If the constructive loan were ignored and the income tax consequences of an interest-bearing advance payment simply deferred until the transaction was closed and interest
no longer accrued on the advance, the net effect upon the parties would be to defer the
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such a rule would be to resolve the administrative problems created by lack of information against taxpaye:r;s who enter into ambiguous transactions. This presumption seems particularly appropriate to the extent that the parties are able to secure loan
treatment for advance payments by expressly providing for stated
interest at a market rate. 113

B.

Obligations Not Attributable to Receipts

A liability need not arise from an initial receipt. Taxpayers ~ou
tinely incur current obligations to perform services or deliver goods
in the future. Since the costs incurred in the performance of those
obligations generally are deductible, the income tax analysis of the
proper treatment of such future costs has focused upon the timing
of deductions rather than upon the proper definition of debt. Nevertheless, the analysis of the proper timing of the deductions attributable to future costs is identical to the analysis of how to
properly time the taxation of receipts. 114 A logically developed system of taxation should treat both forms of obligation alike. The
facts of Case Two can be modified to illustrate this identity.

annual income and deductions attributable to the discounted interest until the conclusion of
the transaction. While imperfect, no other solution is apparent.
The parties could, of course, seek to achieve a deferral of the tax on an advance payment by merely pretending to pay a market rate of ~nterest. For example, A might make a
payment of $100 at the end of year 0 for services to be rendered at the end of year 2. If the
parties treated the value of the services as $121, although they were actually worth only
$100, the advance would be treated as interest-bearing- even though it actually was notand thus would be improperly excluded from income. The utility of that evasion, however,
would be limited.
118

The deferral of tax to the seller would be matched by the offsetting deferral of tax benefit
to the purchaser. If the purchase price were deductible, the deception would not result in a
reduction of the overall tax imposed on the transaction. The pretense would thus be useful
only if the tax burden to the purchaser were less than the tax benefit to the seller, so that
deferral would produce more benefit than harm. However, casting the advance as a loan
would result in the creation of taxable interest income of $21 to the purchaser - income
that would not be created by a non-interest bearing advance payment. If the purchase price
were not deductible, that income would not be offset, at least immediately, and thus would
result in increased taxation of the transaction that would offset the net tax reduction from
deferral.
Some commentators have recognized this identity. See, e.g., Halperin, The Time Value
of Money, 23 Tax Notes 751 (1984).
114
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CASE TWO (DEDUCTION)
Distributor allows Bob to use its real property as a site for a
World's Fair, but on the condition that at the conclusion of the
Fair, Bob will restore the sit~ to its original condition. Restoration
will occur in six years and can be predicted to cost $10,000. Bob
remains subject to a 30% rate of tax and can earn a pre-tax return
of 10% on his investments.

Bob's economic position in this modification of Case Two is
identical to his position in the original version; his assets are offset
by a non-interest bearing obligation to pay, either to Distributor or
to someone else, $10,000 in six years. Under prior law, if Bob were
an accrual method taxpayer, he might well have been entitled to a
deduction for the full $10,000 in year 1, since his obligation to restore the property was fixed and the cost was reasonably determinable.116 If that deduction were allowed, Bob could thereby shelter
$10,000 of his income from current taxation. He thus would be in
the same after-tax position as if he were allowed to offset the entire amount of a non-interest bearing obligation against a receipt.
It is therefore not surprising that the courts would allow Bob to
accrue this deduction well in advance of an actual payment. The
deduction would be entirely consistent with the ali-or-nothing judicial approach to debt, to the extent it completely ignores the
time value of money.
Whether allowing Bob to accrue this deduction would result in
the undertaxation of his transaction depends upon the treatment
of the other party to the transaction, a matter examined below.
However, just as it was clearly improper not to impose any tax on
Bob's. receipt of an interest-free loan in the original Case Two, allowing Bob to deduct the entire $10,000 in year 1 of the modified
Case Two would also be improper. As was the case with the taxation of interest-free receipts, however, establishing the correct
treatment of such non-interest bearing future costs has proven
difficult.
During the same period in which Congress was developing the
bifurcation approach of section 7872 as a means of addressing the
See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2); Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930 (3d
Cir. 1959). See also Aidinoff & Lopata, Section 461 and Accrual-Method Taxpayers: the
Treatment of Liabilities Arising from Obligations to be Performed in the Future, 33 Tax
Lawyer 789 (1980).
110
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tax reduction potential of interest-free receipts, consideration was
given to creating a mechanism for eliminating the similar problems
posed by the undertaxation of future costs. However, the commentators remain sharply divided over how to devise a pattern for allowing deductions. 116 The Treasury Department argued that the
correct pattern would be to allow a deduction in year 1 for an
amount equal to the present value of the obligation, discounted
over the deferral period at an after-tax rate of interest, and that no
further tax benefit should be allowed. 117 Under this approach, in
year 1 Bob would be entitled to a deduction of $6,667, which would
result in an immediate tax benefit of $2,000. However, since that
tax benefit would be equivalent, in present value terms, to not allowing any deduction in year 1 while allowing a deduction for the
full $10,000 in year 6, the Treasury advocated the simpler approach of completely deferring the deduction until the year of performance.116 Under this approach, which is now contained in section 461(h) of the Code, 119 Bob would be entitled to a deduction in
year 6 of $10,000, producing a tax benefit of $3,000, the present
value of which in year 1 would be $2,000.
Other students of taxation, however, contended that the correct
treatment would be to allow a deduction for the present value of
the obligation when it was incurred, computed at a pre-tax rate of
return, and to allow subsequent deductions for the increase in that
present value over time. 120 Those annual increases would equal the
return on the present value of the obligation and, over the period
in which the transaction remained open, would aggregate the difference between the present value of the obligation and its face
amount. Accordingly, by the time the obligation was discharged,

118

For a discussion of the opposing views, see Cunningham, A Theoretical Analysis of the
Tax Treatment of Future Costs, 40 Tax L. Rev. 577 (1985).
117
H.R. Rep. No. 432 (Pt. 2), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1254-55 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Report]: See also Cunningham, supra note 116, at 583 n.30.
118
See 1984 Report, supra note 116, at 1255.
111
Section 461(h) does not, however, require the use of the cash method of accounting in
deducting future costs. Instead, the deduction is deferred until the obligation is economically performed, which may involve less than an out-of-pocket expense. See I.R.C. §
46l(h)(2)(A).
11
° For a discussion of this position, see Cunningham, supra note 116, at 590-99. See also
Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Basic Principles, 36 Tax Notes 623 (Aug. 10,
1987); Halperin & Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Basic Principles Revised,
38 Tax Notes 831 (Feb. 22, 1988).
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the taxpayer would have deducted the entire face amount of the
obligation. Under this approach, Bob would be entitled to a deduction in year 1 of $5,640 and deductions aggregating $4,360 over the
succeeding six years.
As may be observed, these two approaches to the treatment of
future costs are the mirror images of the two approaches to the
taxation of interest-free receipts analyzed above. The position primarily adopted by Congress in section 461(h) corresponds to the
outcome obtained under the ali-or-nothing judicial approach to
debt: full inclusion of the proceeds of the receipt in income. Curiously, then, the position generally rejected by Congress, 121 but
urged by some commentators, corresponds to the bifurcation approach of section 7872.
For precisely the same reasons that led to the conclusion that
the proceeds of an interest-free receipt should be fully included in
income and not subject to bifurcation, the full deferral approach of
section 461(h) produces the correct pattern for deducting future
costs. Since Bob will be entitled to retain the entire amount of the
after-tax return from investing income not dedicated to the pay. ment of his six-year obligation, during that period this income
should be subject to the rules of the sub-system for taxing income,
rather than the sub-system for taxing debt. Thus, Bob's deduction
should be entirely deferred until year 6.
On the other hand, the bifurcation approach would produce a
manifestly incorrect result. Under that approach, Bob would be
entitled to deduct the entire amount of the future cost over a period of years, 122 and would be entitled to that series of deductions
in advance of any actual economic detriment. Under an income
tax, however, permitting a tax benefit in advance of an
equivalent123 economic loss is always improper. Since the general
121
This rejection was less than complete. For a limited category of deductions, Congress
did adopt a bifurcation approach. See I.R.C. § 467; infra note 168.
111
Where the future cost is in the nature of a capital expense or negative salvage value,
the bifurcation approach would mean that the pre-tax present value of the cost would be
depreciated rather than deducted. See Cunningham, supra note 116, at 591.
118
As demonstrated above, permitting an accelerated deduction for the present value of
the future cost would not be improper. However, under the bifurcation approach, the taxpayer would be entitled to deduct not only the present value of the future cost, but also the
annual increase in that present value. Accordingly, that stream of deductions would unavoidably exceed the present value of the future cost and thus would be improper. Indeed,
those annual deductions effectively shield the income from the investment of the untaxed
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effect of a deduction is identical to the effect of an exclusion from
income, the acceleration of those deductions is equivalent to excluding an economic receipt from income. As noted above, 124 that
result is equivalent to excluding from tax the untaxed receipt's return, and thus is improper.
Stated differently, allowing Bob a deduction for funds not yet
transferred would permit Bob to make an investment of untaxed
receipts. However, allowing the investment of a pre-tax receipt is
improper unless the receipt is offset by a repayment obligation
that bears a market rate of interest. When the receipt is offset in
this mannner, the recipient must be permitted to fund the obligation to pay interest through the investment of the pre-tax receipt.
When the obligation is for a future cost, however, no such obligation to pay interest exists. Bob will be entitled to retain the entire
return from the investment of his receipts prior to the discharge of
the future cost. Accordingly, Bob should be subject to the sub-system for taxing income, not the sub-system for taxing debt.
Those favoting the bifurcation approach could surmount this
problem by engaging in an analysis that replicates the justification
for section 7872. Since Bob is obligated in year 1 to in~ur a cost of ·
$10,000 in year 6, he might be viewed as the obligor on a discounted, and thus interest-bearing, loan in that amount. Under
this view of Bob's position, it becomes appropriate to exclude from
income the $5,640 principal amount of the interest-bearing obliga. tion, and to permit the further exclusion of an amount equal to the
interest accruing annually on the principal amount. But that analogy to a discounted loan is no more valid in connection with future
costs than it is in connection with interest-free receipts. If the obligor is to be viewed as the debtor on a loan, he must also be viewed.
as having discharged the future cost for a present payment that is
returned to him as a discounted loan. However, that obligation
could not be discharged in year 1 for a payment equal to the present value of the obligation, discounted at a pre-tax interest rate.
For example, assuming for the sake of analysis that Distributor
would be fully subject to tax on the receipt of the $10,000 in year
6, the after-tax net benefit to be obtained by Distributor would be
$7,000. Therefore, if Bob desired to discharge his obligation in year
amount from taxation - the effect associated with an improperly accelerated deduction.
••• See supra text accompanying notes 105-6.
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1, rather than in year 6, he could do so only by transferring $6,667
to Distributor in that year. After being taxed on that amount, Distributor would be left with $4,667 to invest. In six years, that
amount would grow, after current taxes, to the $7,000 that Distributor would have obtained had it waited until year 6 to receive payment. Accordingly, the present value of Bob's obligation in year 1
is $6,667, and it would be appropriate to grant him a deduction for
that amount in year 1. No further deduction would be granted,
since the obligation is thereby treated for tax purposes as discharged.1211 On the other hand, Bob could not discharge his obligation for a payment equal to $5,640, the pre-tax present value of the
obligation. Accordingly, the analogy is false and it is not correct to
view Bob as the obligor on a discounted $10,000 loan.
Viewed differently, if Bob had discharged his obligation by a
payment in year 1, the payee would have been subject to tax.
Thus, the amount that could be loaned back would be the full
amount of Bob's payment reduced by.income taxation. By treating
Bob as obtaining a discounted loan equal to the full pre-tax
amount of Bob's constructive payment, the bifurcation approach
ignores one level of income taxation and would undertax obligors.
This result is not surprising. The bifurcation of future costs is analytically identical to the bifurcation required by section 7872; both
avoid one level of taxation and thu~ undertax borrowers.
Because a deduction serves the same role in an income tax as an
exclusion from income, the proper treatment of deductions is subject to the same principles that govern the treatment of receipts.
Since obligations to discharge future costs normally do not bear a
stated interest, the proper pattern for deducting those liabilities is
the pattern for taxing non-interest bearing receipts. Thus, the obligation should not be given any effect, for income tax purposes, until it is discharged by incurring an economic detriment. In this context, the judicial approach to debt- with its disregard of the time
value of money- does not produce the correct result. The same is
true of the congressional bifurcation approach. By contrast, the
congressional scheme in Code section 461(h) does reach the correct
result by using the ali-or-nothing approach to defer the tax benefit
of future costs in response to time value of money considerations .
... Granting Bob a $10,000 deduction in year 6 is the equivalent of granting him a $6,667
deduction in year 1.
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THE EFFECT OF NON-PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATION: THE
TAXATION OF CONVERTED TRANSACTIONS

Not uncommonly, transactions conclude in a manner that does
not accord with the original terms established by the parties. A
transaction that was initiated, and properly treated for income tax
purposes, as a loan may later be altered by the parties in a manner
that requires treating the receipt as income and subjecting it to
tax. That is, the receipt will have been converted from debt to income. The cancellation of a traditional loan produces such a result.
While originally taxed as a loan, the transaction will no longer be
eligible for taxation under the sub-system for taxing debt once the
obligation to repay is cancelled. The taxpayer thereby obtains an
increase in net worth which must be subject to tax. A similar conversion commonly occurs in connection with quasi-loans, such as
the security deposits involved in Indianapolis Power, that initially
were treated as debt. 126 Such receipts often are not repaid and thus
are taxed to the borrower upon conversion.
In applying the definition of debt employed by the Supreme
Court, factors bearing on the repayment of receipts assume a critical, perhaps controlling, importance. In the Court's view, the key
factor in determining whether to tax a receipt under the sub-system for taxing debt or income is whether the lender or the borrower controlled the repayment of the receipt. 127 It has already
been demonstrated that, ignoring the possibility of non-payment,
the key to determining whether the receipt and possession of an
amount should be subject to current taxation is whether the receipt is offset by an obligation that requires the actual payment of
a market rate of interest. 128 This section addresses the impact of
the possibility that the receipt will not be repaid.
In designing a pattern of taxation applicable to a transaction, it
is entirely appropriate to examine the taxation of that transaction's conclusion. The overall burden of taxation imposed. is as
much a function of the tax impos~d at this later time - whether
the conclusion is in accord with the original terms of the transaction or not - as it is a function of the initial treatment. Indeed,
examination of the conclusion assumes special importance when a
110
117
110

See Indianapolis Power, 110 S. Ct. at 591.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
See supra text accompanying notes 64-95.
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material likelihood exists that a transaction will not be concluded
in accordance with its terms. An inadequate burden of taxation on
the conversion of the transaction would create an obvious avenue
for taxpayer manipulation.
A.

Converting Debt to Income

The failure to repay the principal amount of a loan results in the
borrower gaining cancellation of indebtedness income on the date
he is relieved of the repayment obligation. The amount of tax imposed, however, is wholly unaffected by whether the borrower has
also failed to pay interest on the loan. If the borrower has in fact
currently paid a market rate of interest on the loan, the failure to
repay the principal will result in a .correct burden of taxation.
However, to the extent that the borrower is also excused from the
making of interest payments, the tax imposed will result in the
substantial undertaxation of the borrower.
CASE THREE
Carrie has borrowed $10,000 on a note that matures in six years
and bears a market rate of interest of 10%. The proceeds of the
note have been reinvested by Carrie, also at a 10% return. Carrie is
subject to a marginal tax rate of 30%.

Clarifying some aspects of this transaction will prove helpful.
The receipt of the $10,000 will not be subject to tax if the transaction is respected as a loan, because the receipt is offset by a repayment obligation of equivalent value. That repayment obligation
can be viewed as consisting of separate· obligations to pay interest
and to repay principal. As discussed above in connection with
Bob's obligation, the present value of the obligation to repay the
$10,000 principal is $6,667, discounted at Carrie's after-tax rate of
return of 7%. Thus, Carrie could invest $6,667 today and in six
years that amount, compounded annually at her 7% net return,
would grow by 1 V2 times to $10,000. Since the repayment of the
principal of a loan does not have income tax consequences, that
$10,000 would be exactly sufficient to permit repayment of the entire receipt.
In this scenario, the present value of the obligation to pay interest is approximately $3,333. Since that interest payment would
have been deductible by Carrie, her annual net burden would have
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been 70% of the $1,000 interest payment, or $700. Thus, the present value of the obligation to repay interest would be the present
value of an annuity for six years of $700, or $3,333. That is, if Carrie had invested the $3,333 at the same 10% return, yielding 7%,
after-tax, the investment would produce a sufficient amount to
make a net payment of $700 (the after-tax burden of the interest
payable on the loan) at the end of each of the next six years, at
which time the investment would have been consumed.
Under the conditions of Case Three, the transaction would not
result in any economic change either before or after income taxes.
The gain from reinvesting the proceeds would be paid in interest
to the lender in each year and the entire receipt would be returned
at the end of the period. Similarly, the tax on the investment return would be exactly offset by the interest deduction, and the
borrowing and repayment would have no income tax consequences.
By contrast, if the receipt were not offset by any repayment obligation and thus treated as taxable income when received, the $10,000
would have been subject to a tax of $3,000, leaving $7,000 to invest.
At the end of six years, that amount would have grown to $10,500.

1. Failure to Repay Loan Principal
The sub-system for taxing debt operates correctly when a taxpayer, who has been paying interest currently at a market rate,
fails to repay the principal amount of the loan. At that point, the
taxpayer is subject to tax on the amount of the proceeds retained
under the usual cancellation of indebtedness principles. For income tax purposes, the transaction is viewed as if the borrower received an economic gain equal to the amount of the debt cancelled
and used that gain to repay the loan. In a normal commercial
transaction, the constructive receipt would be taxable, while the
repayment of the loan would not be deductible. 129 Thus, the net
effect would be to subject the borrower to tax on the amount of the
debt cancelled.
This result appears intuitively correct because imposing such a
tax, at that time, accurately reflects the taxpayer's change in net
no The character and taxability of the cancellation income is a function of the nature of
the loan and the relationship between the parties. See Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness
and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 Tax. L. Rev. 225, 235-36,
248-53 (1959).
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worth. Moreover, this result can be shown to be correct because
the resulting burden of taxation is identical to the burden that
would have been imposed had the amount not repaid been taxed
as. income when first received. Assume, for example, that in Case
Three Carrie pays interest currently, but at the end of year 6 the
obligation to repay the loan is cancelled. To the extent that proceeds are permanently retained, the taxpayer should be subject to
the same burden of taxation as would occur if the receipt had been
treated as income when received. However, if such a retroactive tax
could be imposed with the benefit of hindsight, it would not be
imposed on the entire amount of the receipt. Her receipt would
remain subject to the obligation to repay interest, which has a present value of $3,333, and thus she should not be subject to tax on
that amount. Rather, it would only be appropriate to tax her on
the $6,667 difference between her $10,000 receipt and the value of
the obligation to pay interest. That amount, of course, equals the
present value of the obligation to repay principal which, with hindsight, we know will be cancelled. Thus, a proper burden of taxation
will be imposed upon this converted transaction if it were possible
to tax Carrie on $6,667 in year 1. However, exactly the same burden of taxation will be achieved by taxing $10,000 in year 6 as by
taxing $6,667 in year 1.
If Carrie were taxed upon the cancellation in year 6, she would
be subject to tax on the $10,000 proceeds retained. At her 30% tax
rate, such a tax would leave $7,000 in her ·hands. On the other
hand, had she been taxed in year 1 on $6,667, Carrie's 30% tax
rate would have left her with $4,667 of that amount to invest. Over
the six years, that amount would grow by 1 Vz times to $7,000 precisely the same amount as if the $10,000 amount of the loan
were not taxed until year 6. Indeed, taxing cancellation of indebtedness income, when a market rate of interest is paid, is one application of the principle that the same tax burden results from the
taxation of an amount in the future as from the present taxation of
the present value of that amount, discounted at an after-tax market interest rate. 130 Because $6,667 is the present value of $10,000,
no For an application of this principle in a different context, see Coven, Limiting Losses
Attributable to Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense of the Traditional System Against the At-Risk
Concept, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 41, 68-69 (1986). See also Warren, The Timing of Taxes, 39 Nat'l
Tax J. 499 (1986).
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discounted at Carrie's after-tax interest rate of 7% over six years,
taxing $6,667 in year 1 is the equivalent of taxing $10,000 in year 6.
The results just observed are largely fortuitous; they certainly do
not indicate that the taxing system has evolved an appropriate
method for taxing the forgiveness of the principal amount of a
debt. Thus, for example, if in year 1 the lender forgave the repayment of principal but not the payment of interest, Carrie would
also be subject to tax on the face amount of the cancelled indebtedness, or $10,000. However, her receipt would remain offset by
the present value of the obligation to pay interest. On these assumed facts, Carrie would be overtaxed; her increase in wealth was
only $6,667, not $10,000. 131 Nevertheless, when interest has been
currently paid on a receipt and the obligation to repay the receipt
or further interest is cancelled, the borrower's accretion to wealth
is in fact properly taxed. This fortunate result should have substantial implications for designing the taxation of the initial
receipt.

2.

Failure to Repay Principal and Interest

An equitable tax burden is not achieved, however, if the borrower completely fails to make any repayments on the receipt. Returning to Case Three, assume that Carrie not only does not repay
the $10,000 principal amount of the receipt upon maturity, but
also does not pay any interest over the six years. On these facts,
Carrie has in effect converted the character of the entire receipt
from that of a loan to taxable income. Accordingly, if it were
known in year 1 that Carrie would not make any repayments of the
receipt, she quite properly would have been taxed on the entire
$10,000 in that year. In retrospect, the obligation to repay was illusory; Carrie in fact obtained a $10,000 increase in her net worth in
year 1.
The foregoing analysis suggests that, if in fact Carrie is not subject to tax until year 6 because her failu~e to make any repayments
The assumed facts are not wholly unrealistic. A borrower, such as a shareholder of the
corporate lender, may not intend to repay the principal of a loan, but may nevertheless
make current payments of interest, perhaps to insure that the receipt is characterized as a
loan rather than a dividend. As indicated in the text, such a borrower should be taxed on
the present value of the obligation to repay the principal in the year the loan is obtained,
rather than on the full face amount of the receipt. The latter would occur under the judicial
approach to debt.
181
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was not known in year 1, the correct tax will be achieved if she is
taxed on $15,000 in year 6. As was the case when Carrie paid interest and only failed to repay loan principal, taxing $10,000 in the
future is the equivalent of taxing $6,667 in the present, and taxing
$15,000 in the future is the equivalent of taxing $10,000 in the
present.
This result, however, is not achieved under the current taxing
system. Instead, despite the fact that Carrie has not made any payments of interest, she will nevertheless only be subject to tax on
$10,000 in year 6. This is precisely the same burden of taxation
that would be imposed if she had paid interest on the receipt currently and had only failed to repay the principal. In this scenario,
Carrie might be viewed as receiving a taxable economic benefit
from the cancellation of the obligation to pay either principal or
interest and, constructively, using that amount to repay the
lender. 132 However, even if Carrie were taxed on an amount equal
to the full interest and principal cancelled, under such a reconstruction of the transaction she would be entitled to a deduction
for the interest constructively paid. 133 As a result, the net amount
subject to tax on the cancellation would only equal the $10,000
principal amount of the receipt.
Under an income tax, failure to pay interest is logically not
treated as gain but rather as the avoidance of loss, and thus is not
subject to tax. 134 Nevertheless, the net result of applying the subsystem for taxing debt to unpaid interest is to substantially undertax borrowers on the cancellation of their obligations to pay
principal or interest.
The magnitude of this flaw in the sub-system for taxing debt is
,.. See Allan v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1988) (the principal amount of a
mortgage, plus the unpaid interest accrued thereon, constituted the amount realized upon
the transfer of the encumbered property to the lender in lieu of foreclosure). In Allan the
propriety of an offsetting constructive deduction was not at issue because the accrual
method borrower had previously deducted the interest as it accrued - deductions that were
not challenged by the Commissioner.
188
Under current law this result is achieved by ignoring the cancellation of indebtedness
income produced by the cancellation of an obligation, the actual payment of which would
have been deductible. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(2). Cf. Del Cotto & Joyce, Double Benefits and
Transactional Consistency Under the Tax Benefit Rule, 39 Tax L. Rev. 473, 492 (1984). The
Code rule was required because the judiciary generally overlooked the point. See, e.g.,
Schrott v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 981 (1989).
, .. See Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness Redux: The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980
Proposals - Corporate Aspects, 36 Tax L. Rev. 1, 19 (1980).
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readily apparent. Carrie would have obtained $10,000 in year 1
without incurring any tax and thus could have reinvested that full
pre-tax amount. At her after~tax rate of return of 7%, the $10,000
would grow to $15,000 after six years. Upon payment.of a $3,000
tax in year 6 on the unpaid principal amount of the loan, Carrie
would be left with $12,000. By contrast, had the initial receipt been
subject to tax, she would only have been able to invest the aftertax proceeds. of the receipt, and in year 6 that amount would have
grown to $10,500. Carrie, therefore, would gain $1,500 as the result
of the initial characterization of her receipt as a loan, rather than
taxable income, even though in retrospect the receipt was the economic equivalent of income. This result is significantly more
favorable to Carrie than the outcome produced by either the subsystem for taxing debt or the sub-system for taxing income.
The net result of all this is to extend to Carrie the income tax
benefits of the sub-system for taxing debt, even though she did not
bear the burdens that would justify that pattern of taxation. Thus,
while she derived the benefits of the receipt of taxable income
from the initiation of the transaction, she was able to defer the
taxation of the receipt. Indeed, the $1,500 benefit derived by Carrie represents her return for investing the $3,000 tax payable on
the receipt over the six years the transaction remained open. In
fact, Carrie would obtain exactly the same tax preference as Bob
would have obtained in Case Two had he not been subject to any
tax on his interest-free receipt. This result is hardly surprising; the
failure to pay interest is actually the equivalent of obtaining an
interest-free loan in the first instance.

3.

Failure to Repay Bifurcated Loans

Interest on a loan, of course, need riot be paid currently. Debt
may be issued for an amount less than the amount to be repaid at
maturity, in which event the element of discount represents an interest factor that will be paid at maturity. 1311 When interest is not
paid, the undertaxation of the borrower occurs regardless of
whether the unpaid interest was payable currently or discounted.
However, because the payments of interest on a discounted loan
18
° For a recent example of such an instrument, see Prabel v. Commissioner, 882 F.2d 820,
821 (3d Cir. 1989).
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will not be made until the obligation to repay principal matures,
the failure to· repay the loan inevitably will extend to interest as
well as principal. Accordingly, upon the failure to repay a loan
bearing discounted interest only, the borrower almost certainly will
be undertaxed.
Under the definition of debt adopted by Congress, if the value of
the repayment obligation is less than the amount of the receipt,
the transaction is bifurcated, thereby creating a discounted loan. 136
Thus, by its terms, section 7872 produces the type of loan that will
result in the undertaxation of borrowers if the loan is not fully repaid. Accordingly, applying the congressional approach to debt creates a tax avoidance opportunity.
Case Two examined an interest-free loan which, under section
7872, would be reconstructed as if it consisted of compensation in
the amount of $4,360 and a discounted loan in the amount of
$5,640. Assuming, for the sake of analysis, that the section 7872
reconstruction is correct, Bob would be properly taxed if he repaid
the entire amount of the $10,000 receipt. However, if in year 6 the
employer forgave the obligation to repay the ·receipt, Bob would
not be .. properly taxed. Under general principles of taxation, Bob
would have cancellati<;m of indebtedness income in the form of
$10,000 in compensation. Of that amount, $5,640 would be attributable to the cancellation of the obligation· to repay the principal
amount of the loan and $4,360 would represent a recapture of the
interest deductions previously claimed. 137
As a result, the net amount upon which Bob would be taxed

138

See I.R.C. § 7872(b).
Under § 7872, the debt portion of the receipt is treated as a discounted loan for which
interest must be accrued annuallY.. See I.R.C. § 163(e)(1). The failure to repay amounts for
which a deduction has been claimed would result in income under t8x benefit principles.
Normally it would not matter whether the amount representing interest was taxable
under cancellation of indebtedness or tax benefit principles; the tax imposed would be the
same. However, when the debtor's economic benefit from the cancellation would not be taxable, the characterization of the transaction would matter. Under tax benefit theory, the
restoration of the prior deductions would be taxable. That would arise when a shareholder
cancels a corporate obligation to repay principal and accrued interest. The issue has divided
the commentators. Compare Eustice, supra note 129, at 252 (favoring the imposition of the
tax under tax benefit theory) with Bittker & Thompson, Income From the Discharge of
Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 Calif. L. Rev. 1159,
1180-81 (1978) (favoring no taxation under the cancellation theory). Congress correctly decided to impose the tax. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(6); S. Rep. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19
n.22 (1980).
187
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would be only $5,640; the cancellation of his obligation to pay interest would not have any net income tax consequences. Bob would
thereby derive a benefit from the undertaxation of his transaction
identical to the benefit Carrie derived by failing to repay principal
or interest in Case Three. As in Case Three, that benefit would
equal the deferral of tax on $5,640 of the receipt over the six years
the transaction remained open. 138 Because of this undertaxation of
converted debt (and notwithstanding the adoption of section
7872), Bob's employer can confer a significant after-tax economic
benefit on him· by disguising a portion of his compensation as an
interest-free loan. 139 Because of the tax avoidance potential inherent in the non-payment of discounted loans, failure to repay these
loans should prove to be a popular technique for avoiding taxation.
Even in the unlikely event that this strategic non-repayment
does not occur, unplanned defaults are far more likely under section 7872 than in the case of arm's-length commercial loans. The
transactions subject to section 7872 are loans between related parties (i.e., members of a family or shareholders in closely held corporations), in which the parties~ fundamental objective is to transfer an economic benefit to the borrower at a minimum income and
transfer tax cost. The repayment of such a loan will occur only if
repayment is consistent with the mutual income tax or estate planning objectives of the parties, and is not compelled by considera7
tions of honest dealing or the need to maintain a sound credit rating. Since the primary purpose of the transaction is to confer an
economic benefit upon the transferee, it can be anticipated that
repayment quite commonly will not occur.
Furthermore, if this bifurcation approach were to be applied to
quasi-loan transactions (as exemplified by the deposit system involved in Indianapolis Power), the likelihood of undertaxation
would be equally great. Receipts such as security deposits and advance payments generally do not conclude in a repayment. In Indianapolis Power, for example, it was conceded that over one-half of
all deposits were applied by the customers to the payment of their
118

Bob's benefit is actually greater than this. Because he was entitled to accrue deductions for discounted interest annually, he has in effect accelerated deductions in that
amount in exchange for the deferred tax, upon his failure to pay interest. Thus, Bob will
benefit from this additional tax deferral.
110
Whether the transaction as a whole will be undertaxed is a function of the taxation of
the other party, a topic addressed below. See infra text accompanying notes 153-72.
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utility bills. uo Similarly, intuition suggests that most deposits
treated as loans, such as those securing the payment of the last
month's rental, are not actually repaid but rather are applied in
satisfaction of the secured rental. In connection with some categories of receipts, such as advance payments for goods, the clear intention of both parties to the transfer is that the receipt will not be
repaid.
There is, therefore, a material likelihood that non-interest bearing receipts will not in fact be repaid. If these receipts have been
characterized under the tax laws as discounted loans, failure to repay will result in the undertaxation of the borrower. This aspect of
the sub-system for taxing debt should also have substantial implications for the design of the initial taxation of the receipt.
4.

Failure to Discharge Bifurcated Future Costs

As previously noted, 141 some have suggested that the taxation of
obligations to incur future costs should mirror section 7872, and
that the taxpayer should therefore be granted a series of deductions in anticipation of the actual economic outlay. In practice, of
course, many such obligations will rtot actually be met. When this
occurs, the transaction will have absolutely no economic consequences. For example, in the deduction modification of Case Two,
if Bob did not in fact restore the property to its original condition
at the conclusion of the World's Fair, the anticipated future cost
would not actually be accompanied by a change in the financial
position of any party.
The undertaxation that occurs when a bifurcated loan is not repaid is far more abusive when the obligation is attributable to incurring a future cost, rather than to a receipt. Under the bifurcation approach to deductions, the taxpayer would have been
entitled to deductions equalling the full face amount of the obligation prior to the deadline for discharge of the obligation. Upon the
ultimate failure to discharge that liability, the taxpayer would of
course be subject to a recapture tax on an amount equal to the
deductions previously claimed. However, the combination of deductions in early years and income in subsequent years results in a
••• See supra note 20.
••• See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
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material after-tax economic benefit. The taxpayer would have deferred income taxes on an amount of income equal to the deductions claimed over the period of time that the transaction remained open. Accordingly, in this instance the net effect of
bifurcating future costs that are not actually incurred is to convert
a transaction that had no pre-tax economic effect into one that
produces an after-tax benefit. Such a negative rate of tax is plainly
improper.
B.

Implications of the Taxation of Converted Debt

The foregoing analysis strongly confirms the conclusions reached
thus far concerning the taxation of the initial receipt. A correct
burden of taxation will be achieved only if the tax rules discriminate between those receipts that are offset by obligations bearing a
market rate of interest and those receipts that are not.
:Whether or not the receipt is repaid, a borrower that is paying a
market rate of interest on the obligation to repay a receipt will be
taxed appropriately under the rules of the sub-system for taxing
debt. Thus, in Case One, as long as Abbie actually paid the stated
market rate of interest on her obligation, she would be properly
taxed regardless of whether she repaid the loan or permanently retained the proceeds. Accordingly, there is simply no reason to permit the taxation of the initial receipt to be altered as a function of
the likelihood of repayment. For an interest-bearing loan, factors
concerning the repayment of the principal amount of the loan are
wholly irrelevant to the proper taxation of the initial receipt; a correct overall taxation of the transaction is assured in either event.
At the same time, the injection of factors bearing upon repayment into the initial characterization of the receipt is not merely
pointless. If the exclusion from income of such an interest-bearing
receipt were successfully challenged, and the receipt recharacterized as income at a time when the taxpayer remained subject to an
obligation to pay interest, an improper burden of taxation would
be imposed. Because the taxpayer's increase in wealth did not
equal the full face amount of the receipt, the resulting tax would
be excessive and the borrower would be overtaxed.
It follows, therefore, that the definition of debt employed by the
Supreme Court is fundamentally flawed. Drawing upon its prior
decisions, in Indianapolis Power the Court placed extreme emphasis upon the taxpayer's control over the repayment of the principal
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amount o~ the receipt, and thus upon the potential for an actual
repayment, while discounting the significance of the payment of
interest. That analysis is simply backward, for it is the presence of
a market rate of interest that should be of controlling importance.
Thus, even if it were certain in Indianapolis Power that the security deposits would not be repaid, a proper burden of taxation
would be achieved by imposing tax in the year that the deposit was
converted to a payment for services and interest no longer accrued
to the customer. 142 It is clearly a waste of administrative and judicial resources to seek to characterize such a receipt as immediately
taxable income, rather than the proceeds of a loan. 1 ' 3
On the other· hand, if neither the principal nor interest on a receipt is repaid, that fact is of substantial importance to the. initial
taxation of the receipt. Under these conditions an incorrect burden
of taxation is produced, and the recipient will be materially undertaxed. This source of undertaxation is deeply ingrained in the
sub-system for taxing debt, and cannot be avoided under the existing income tax regime. 14 ' While any form of loan may result in
the non-payment of both principal and interest, that possibility is
most pronounced when the interest appears in the form of a dis,.. This assumes, as did the Court, that the interest paid was at a market rate.
148
Evidence that interest stated on a loan might not be paid, however, would be relevant
to the characterization of the receipt. If the borrower does not in fact intend to pay interest
on a loan, the "loan" should be treated as non-interest bearing and fully included as income
at the time of receipt. That inquiry, however, assumes that the payment of interest, and not
the likelihood that the receipt's principal will be repaid, will be of paramount importance.
••• This improper allocation of the income tax burden, resulting from the complete cancellation of the repayment obligation, could be eliminated by a modification of the income
tax rules. Thus, the benefit to Carrie of the six year deferral of her tax liability could be
eliminated by imposing a statutory interest charge on the tax arising from the cancellation
of her loan for the period in which the loan was outstanding, but interest was not paid.
While such an approach would be correct in principle, it does not appear to be feasible.
A statutory interest charge would prove far more complex to design and administer than
· might at first appear. It would only apply to the extent that the borrower had not actually
paid a market rate of interest on the cancelled loan. Thus, the charge would have to be
designed to take account of whatever interest was in fact paid on the loan, giving due effect
to any tardiness in payments. Thus, the computation of such an interest charge would be
highly complex. Secondly, it would be improper to increase the effective tax burden on the
borrower without simultaneously decreasing the effective tax burJen on the lender. Thus,
the imposition of a statutory interest charge on the borrower would require the making of
an identical, and equally complex, refund of tax to the lender. However, lenders would only
be entitled to relief to the extent that they would have been entitled to a tax benefit from
the failure to obtain a repayment of the loan. That determination, too, would be both factually and legally complex.
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count payable only on the maturity of the loan. Accordingly, sound
income tax policy would be to avoid, rather than encourage, the
creation of discounted debt.
If it were ever appropriate to treat a receipt that is offset by a
non-interest bearing obligation as a discounted loan, it would be
necessary to include within the definition of debt a subjective evaluation of the likelihood that the debt would be repaid, a test not
unlike that applied today by the Supreme Court. Unlike interestbearing receipts, ignoring the possibility of non-payment would
create too great a potential for tax avoidance. The administration
of such a test, however, would be difficult and uncertain. Even
where successful, the test would not eliminate the undertaxation of
borrowers who did not in fact repay principal or interest, even if
they initially had intended to do so.
A vastly superior result would be reached, however, if the taxation of receipts that are offset by non-interest bearing repayment
obligations were not deferred at all. The conversion of debt to in. come through the non-repayment of tl:le receipt cannot result in
undertaxation if either the full amount of the receipt were included in income at the time of the initial receipt, or if the entire
deduction for a future cost were deferred until payment.
Following through the income tax consequences of applying the
section 7872 approach to debt therefore confirms the conclusions
reached above. A superior overall tax burden is achieved by the
full inclusion of interest-free receipts in income rather than by bifurcating the receipt and treating a portion as a discounted loan.
Indeed, even if it were concluded that the initial receipt would be
as correctly taxed under the bifurcation approach as it would be
under full inclusion, bifurcation would nevertheless be the inferior
solution because of the tax avoidance resulting from the failure to
repay such a receipt.
VI.

Low-INTEREST LoANS

The discussion to this point has assumed an unrealistically po-.
larized world in which receipts either bore a market rate of interest
or none at all. In practice, however, a wide variety of receipts are
offset by repayment obligations that do bear a stated rate of interest. However, the stated interest often falls materially short of a
market rate of interest. In Indianapolis Power, for example, interest was only paid on deposits after they had been held for over one
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year. 146 Thus, the effective interest paid by the taxpayer inevitably
fell below a market rate of interest. A principal defect in the ali-ornothing judicial approach to debt is the inability to deal with below-market obligations in a tailored fashion. Thus, regardless of
how the receipt is characterized for tax purposes, the tax burden
imposed will be partly right and partly wrong. 146 On the other
hand, the great advantage of the congressional approach to debt,
with its computation of the present value of the repayment obligation, is that any stated interest will automatically affect the computation of the amount that will be respected as a loan.
Low-interest loans cannot be taxed correctly without bifurcating
the receipt in some manner. For the same reasons as indicated
above, the recipient of a low-interest loan would be overtaxed if
the interest obligation were ignored and the receipt fully taxed, yet
that same individual would be undertaxed if the inadequate interest caused the entire amount of the receipt to be treated as nontaxable.m However, the form of bifurcation adopted in section
7872 is incorrect and does not produce a correct burden of taxation
on the receipt. Clearly, the proper taxation of low-interest loans
requires a different approach to bifurcation.
It has been shown that receipts will be properly taxed if they are
entirely excluded from income, to the extent they are offset by obligations that bear a market rate of interest. 148 Moreover, they will
be properly taxed if they are entirely included in income, to the
.extent they are offset by non-interest bearing obligations. For that
purpose, only interest stated by the parties, and not interest artificially created through bifurcation, should be taken into account. If
low-interest loans were divided into these two categories, the receipt could be taxed in accordance with the approach outlined
here, and thus a correct tax burden could be achieved. In fact, such
a division can be readily accomplished.
When a receipt is offset by a repayment obligation that bears a
below-market stated rate of interest, the amount of the receipt
that should be treated as a loan, and excluded from income, is the
... 110 S. Ct. at 591.
148
The difficulty of reconciling the time value of money and the ali-or-nothing approach
to debt troubled the Seventh Circuit in Indianapolis Power. See Indianapolis Power, 857
F.2d at 1170 n.12.
,.. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
••• See. supra text accompanying notes 64-95.
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amount for which the present value of the actual interest established by the parties would represent a market rate of interest. By
attributing all stated interest to the computed portion of the receipt, this portion of the receipt becomes offset by an obligation
that bears a market rate of interest, and thus is properly excluded
from income. Both for income tax purposes and as a reflection of
economic reality, the balance of the receipt would continue to be
offset by a repayment obligation. However, that obligation would
be a non-interest bearing obligation and, under the proposals made
here, such a receipt would be subject to taxation in full when
received.
The income tax consequences produced under such a revised bifurcation of low-interest loans are best understood through an examination of a few simple illustrations.
Example 1. A loans $10,000 to B for six years and charges no interest, although the market rate of interest would have been 10%.
The entire amount of the receipt would be· currently taxed to B.
Under current law, B would only be taxed on the excess of $10,000
over the present value of $10,000 discounted at 10% over six years,
or $4,360.
Example 2. C loans $10,000 to D for six years, charging 6% interest when a market rate would have been 10%. The actual interest
paid, $600 annually, represents a market rate of interest on $6,000.
Therefore, D would be currently taxed on $4,000; $6,000 of the receipt would be treated as debt. Under current law, D would only be
taxed on the excess of $10,000 over the present value of all payment to be made, or approximately $1,744.
Example 3. E loans F $7,384 in exchange for F's non-interest bearing note for $10,000 payable in six years. Discounted interest of
$2,616 ($10,000 minus $7,384) would be paid on a loan in the
amount of $3,384 if a 10% market rate of interest had been
charged. Therefore, F would be currently taxed on $4,000. Under
current law, F would be taxed on $1,744 ($7,384 less $5,640, the
present value of $10,000).
Example 4. G loans H $10,000 on a demand note and charges 6%
annual interest. If a market rate of interest were 10%, H would be
currently taxed on $4,000; only $6,000 would be treated as a loan.
Under current law, H would be taxed annually on the forgone interest of $400 but would be permitted an interest deduction for the
same amount.
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This revised approach to the bifurcation of low-interest loans is
fully consistent with the current method of taxing wholly interestfree receipts and would impose a correct level of tax. The second
example is a perfect illustration. On the receipt, D would be subject to a tax of 30% of $4,000, or $1,200, which would leave $8,800
to invest. Of the $880 pre-tax return on that amount produced by
the market rate of 10%, $600 would be required to discharge the
deductible obligation to pay interest, leaving $280 subject to tax.
Thus, the annual after-tax investment return to D would be $196.
That amount is the proper after-tax return on the investment of
the after-tax proceeds from the receipt of $4,000 in taxable income.1"9 Under this approach, D would not be taxed on an amount
sufficient to generate the funds needed to pay the actual interest
charged on his loan ($6,000) but would be taxed on the amount of
the receipt in excess of that principal amount. Thus, the taxation
of D's receipt would have been properly allocated between the subsystem for taxing income and the sub-system for taxing debt.
In addition to producing a correct result, the results reached in
these examples represent a substantial practical improvement over
present law. The suggested approach to bifurcation is markedly
simpler to apply than the extensive reconstruction required by section 7872. The approach is also more sensible and understandable
because it conforms far more closely to the actual economic arrangement of the parties. Perhaps more importantly, by not artificially creating interest (the payment of which is deferred until maturity), this approach minimizes the likelihood that interest will
not be paid on the portion of the receipt treated as debt. As a result, this method of bifurcating low-interest loans would minimize
the undertaxation that occurs upon failure to repay.
Moreover, as example 4 indicates, a secondary benefit of the suggested revision is the ability to treat demand and term loans alike.
Under section 7872, demand loans are treated quite differently
than term loans. 150 Because the aggregate amount of discounted
interest cannot be computed when the maturity of a loan is unknown, interest for demand loans is computed on the entire
amount of the receipt and taxed annually to the borrower. 151 One
1 0
•

$4,000

[1-.30) X .10 X [1-.30) = $196.
I.R.C. § 7872(a) with I.R.C. § 7872(b).
I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1).
X

° Compare

16

161
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result of this difference in treatment is that a materially larger artificial interest charge is created for demand loans than for term
loans in the identical amount. 1112 This disparity constitutes a major
conceptual flaw in section 7872. Under the proposed method of bifurcation, however, it is not necessary to compute the term of the
loan. Rather, the proportion of the receipt treated as a loan is a
function of the ratio of the stated interest to a market rate of interest. Thus, demand and term loans would be taxed consistently.
The resulting ability to conform the treatment of these two types
of loans would represent a substantial improvement in the rationality of the treatment of debt.
VII.

THE TAXATION OF THE OTHER PARTY TO THE TRANSACTION

Imperfect taxation of transactions is not always a critical flaw. If
the burden of taxation imposed upon one party to a transaction is
balanced by an equal but opposite tax benefit extended to the
other party, the imperfection in the pattern of taxation will not
result in an incorrect level of taxation for the transaction as a
whole. In other words, the error will not have a net revenue effect.
Rather, the imperfection will merely shift the burden of taxation
from one party to the other. However, in many circumstances, if
the tax rules are known in advance, the parties will be able to adjust their transaction to produce the same after-tax economic consequences as would have resulted under a perfect pattern of taxation.1113 When that ability is present, the marketplace will absorb
the inequity that the imperfect pattern of taxation otherwise might
have produced.
When conditions allow the parties to a transaction to account for
an imperfect pattern of taxation, modification of the tax rules may
not be productive. The imperfection will not have a revenue effect
and will not result in unfairness to taxpayers. On the other hand,
amending tax rules creates both costs and risks. Rational amend••• The principal amount of a term loan is the present value of the payments to be made.
Thus, it will be less than the face amount of the repayment obligation. See I.R.C.
§ 7872(b)(1). On the other hand, the principal amount of a demand loan is the entire
amount transferred, and annual interest on that larger amount is treated as paid annually.
See I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1).
••• See Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposal for Mandatory Uniform Rules,
44 Tax. L. Rev. 145, 164 (1989); Halperin & Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations:
Basic Principles Revisited, 38 Tax Notes 831, 836 (Feb. 22, 1988).
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ments to the Code are difficult to achieve, can be highly complex,
and may not operate properly. On balance, retaining an imperfect
pattern of taxation that does not have major ill effects may be
preferable to undertaking the revision of the tax rules.
The converse, however, is also true. If the income tax consequences of a pattern of taxation are not balanced by an offsetting
impact upon another party, the tax rules will have a revenue effect.
The transaction as a whole will be either over- or undertaxed.
Moreover, whether the tax consequences are balanced or not, if the
parties cannot adjust the form of their transaction to account for
the tax system's imperfections, one or both parties will be treated
unfairly. Under these conditions, reforming the tax rules to eliminate imperfect patterns of taxation becomes necessary.
In theory, the income tax consequences of the transactions considered in this article will normally be balanced. Under the assumptions employed thus far - that both the borrower and the
lender are subject to the same rate of tax; that all funds are invested for the same return - a loan is not a revenue generating
transaction. m The income tax burdens imposed on one party to
the loan will be precisely offset by income tax benefits available to
. the other party. Furthermore, this symmetrical result is not altered
by the imperfect taxation of the borrower. described above. The
improper taxation level of the borrower will be precisely offset by
corresponding imperfections in the taxation of the lender.
Case Two, for example, involved a $10,000 receipt, offset by a
non-interest bearing repayment obligation, that matured in six
years. This receipt should have been entirely included in Bob's income when it was received. Since Bob was subject to a 30% tax
rate, under that approach Bob would derive $7,000 from the transfer and pay a tax of $3,000. However, Bob's employer would be
entitled to an immediate deduction for the $10,000 payment. After
reflecting its tax benefit of $3,000, the net cost to the employer of
the payment would be the same $7,000 that Bob received, and no
net revenue would be generated or lost by the transfer.
It is clear that the failure to impose any tax on the $10,000 receipt in Case Two would result in the undertaxation of the recipient. However, a different tax rule would not necessarily have any
104

See Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 Yale L. J.
506, 510 (1986).
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effect upon the transaction's overall tax burden. If Bob were not to
be taxed because the receipt was entirely treated as a loan, the
employer would not be entitled to any deduction. As a result, the
benefit that Bob would obtain from the deferral of tax would be
precisely offset by the employer's burden of having to defer its own
tax benefit. As a result of the new tax rule exempting the receipt
from taxation, the net cost to the employer would be the full
$10,000 of the payment. Meanwhile, Bob would obtain a full
$10,000 economic benefit.
It might appear that the net effect of not taxing the receipt
would be to improperly shift the tax burden on Bob's compensation from Bob to the employer. Indeed, this effect of balanced income tax rules is sometimes referred to as surrogate or substitute
taxation. The tax properly attributable to Bob is instead paid by
his employer. However, if the parties understand that this element
of compensation will be ignored for income tax purposes, they can
revise their transaction to retrieve the desired after-tax economic
consequences. Here, for example, by reducing the amount of the
payment to $7,000, the parties will be left in the same after-tax
position as if the payment had been properly taxed. The employer's net after-tax expenses after the payment would be $7,000
- precisely the amount of Bob's benefit. If the parties address the
desired after-tax consequences of their transaction, normal market
forces will cause the parties to make precisely that adjustment and
the surrogate tax will be shifted from the employer back to Bob. 1115
Under these conditions, surrogate taxation may actually play a
positive role in the taxing system. It may be far simpler, for example, to impose a tax on the employer (by disallowing its deduction)
than to impose a tax on Bob. 1116
If the instances of excessive or inadequate taxation identified
thus far were all capable of being offset by the operation of surrogate taxation, reform of the tax rules would be of little consequence. The statutory pattern, while defective in principle, would
not result in an improper overall burden of taxation on the trans,.. One way of describing this result is to say that in selecting a tax-exempt source of
income, Bob has subjected himself to an implicit tax of $3,000 - which reduces his net
after-tax income to $7,000.
'"" Compare, for example, the provisions of § 274 that disallow deductions to employers
for untaxed benefits provided to employees.
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action or unavoidable unfairness to a party. Thus, it would not be
of much consequence whether the receipt was taxed fully, or not at
all, under the judicial approach to debt, or whether it was bifurcated under the congressional approach. 1117 However, precisely because the transactions examined by this article contain income tax
consequences that generally are not balanced, the propriety of the
judicial and the congressional approaches to debt is a matter of
concern.
A.

Sources of Imbalance

When the tax consequences of a transfer are not balanced, the
incorrect taxation of the recipient will not be offset by the surrogate taxation of the payor, and the transaction as a whole will be
improperly taxed. Imbalance in the taxation of any transaction
may occur for a variety of reasons, the most apparent of which is
that the parties may not face the same effective rates of tax. 1118 The
most significant source of imbalance, however, occurs when the
payment, while taxable to the recipient, is not deductible by the
payor. Returning to Case Two, under a correct pattern of taxation,
the receipt might be fully taxed when received- producing a tax
of $3,000. If, however, the payment of the $10,000 were not deductible by the payor at any time, the treatment of the payor would
not offset the treatment of the recipient and the transaction would
generate a net tax liability of $3,000. Under these circumstances, if
the tax rules were changed and a pattern of taxation adopted that
wholly exempted the receipt from tax, that change in the rules
would have a revenue effect. The revenue generated by the receipt
Indeed, the significance of § 7872 is confined to circumstances where the payor and
the payee do not face the same marginal rate of tax. Thus, if the payor is a corporation and
the non-loan portion of the payment would be recharacterized as a dividend, the payor
would not be entitled to a deduction while the payee would have taxable income. Similarly,
in the context of a gift loan, the payee may well be in a lower income tax bracket than the
payor. In general, § 7872 has declined in importance under the current, less progressive
income tax structure.
••• This aspect of the taxing system, while not unimportant, lacks the significance today
that it once held. Under current law, the rate structure applicable to individuals is far more
uniform than during prior periods, and the maximum rates of tax applicable to corporations
are roughly equivalent to the maximum rates applicable to other taxpayers. Nevertheless,
the ever-present potential for disparities in marginal rates of tax suggests that surrogate
taxation and market forces should not be relied upon as cures for the imperfections of the
taxing system.
107
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would have been lost through the amendment, but no offsetting
revenue would be gained from the correlative treatment of the
payor. Thus, under this pattern of taxation, the transaction would
receive a $3,000 subsidy as compared to a pattern of taxation imposing an immediate tax upon the receipt. 1119
A payment may not be deductible for a number of different reasons. A transfer from a corporation to a shareholder that is not
respected as a loan may be a non-deductible dividend. Alternatively, the payment may not be deductible because it must be capitalized as part of the cost of an asset with continuing value. 160
Thus, even if the payment represented compensation, the treatment of the payor might not balance the treatment of the payee.
Quite commonly, however, the payment will not· be deductible because it represents an expenditure for consumption by the payor.
This was the situation in Indianapolis Power. While the utility recipient in that case was, of course, subject to tax on all payments
received for providing power, the primarily non-business customers
required to make deposits with the utility were not entitled to income tax deductions for the payments they made. As a result, the
income tax treatment of the customers did not :vary with the characterization of the transaction. Thus, any undertaxation of the re-.
ceipt by the utility would not be offset by the surrogate overtaxation of the customers.
Because of the wide range of circumstances in which the treatment of the recipient is not balanced by the treatment of the
payor, reliance upon surrogate taxation to eliminate the overall undertaxation of transactions is generally unsound. In the context of
interest-free receipts, however, surrogate taxation is particularly
inappropriate. Non-interest bearing receipts are not random commercial transactions, but instead represent deliberate steps taken
by the parties to provide a particular form of economic benefit to
the payee. This may occur either because such a benefit ·is mutually intended, as exemplified by an interest-free loan between related parties, or it may be coerced by the economic power of one
This subsidy may be shared by the parties. If, for example, only $8,500 were transferred, the net cost of the payment to the payor WQuld be less, and the net benefit from the
payment to the recipient would be greater, than the costs and benefits resulting from a
correct pattern of taxation.
••• See I.R.C. § 263. See also Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974).
100
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party, as occurred in Indianapolis Power. In these contexts, income tax consequences are particularly susceptible to taxpayer manipulation. If the recipien~s of interest-free loans are undertaxed,
this method of transferring an economic benefit would be selected
by the parties when surrogate taxation did not eliminate all of the
tax benefit from the arrangement. Significantly, most of the quasiloan cases to come before the Supreme Court involved non-deductible consumption expenditures by the payors of the receipts for
which exclusion was sought. 161 In these instances, surrogate taxation would not work at all.

B.

Deductible Obligations

Balanced income tax consequences are no less significant when
the obligation is not attributable to a receipt but instead represents a future cost. 162 If the income tax consequences of the transaction are not balanced and the obligor is undertaxed, the transaction as a whole will be improperly undertaxed. 163 In the context of
See Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. at 595 (gambling); Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S.
128, 130 (1963) (dancing lessons); American Automobile, 367 U.S. at 688 (automobile club).
101
Recalling the modification of Case Two, in year 1 Bob incurred a deductible obligation
to make a payment of $10,000 in year 6. On these facts it was observed that Bob would be
correctly taxed if his deduction of the full $10,000 were deferred to year 6, as required by
§ 461(h). In that event, the transfer would be revenue-neutral if Distributor, the other party
to the transaction, were required to report the full $10,000 payment in the same year 6.
However, the transaction would also be revenue-neutral if Bob were entitled to claim his
deduction in year 1, provided that the Distributor was also required to report the payment
in year 1. Of course, under that pattern of taxation, Bob would be undertaxed by the value
of the accelerated deduction, but the employer would be overtaxed by the same amount.
As in the case of a receipt, if the income tax consequences were known beforehand, the
parties could account for the imperfection in the pattern of taxation. The after-tax cost of a
payment of $10,000 in year 6, deductible at that time, would be $7,000 and the present value
of that amount would be $4,667. Similarly, the year 1 present value of the after-tax benefit
to the Distributor of a $10,000 taxable payment in year 6 would be the same $4,667. If
instead the payment were deductible in year 1, although still not made until year 6, that
pattern of taxation would benefit the payor while equally burdening the recipient. However,
the surrogate taxation of the recipient would be shifted back to the payor if the amount of
the payment were increased to $12,716. The present v8Iue of a payment in year 6 of that
amount, less the benefit of a deduction in year 1 for that amount, would equal the net cost
of $4,667 that Bob would incur, and the net benefit that Distributor would obtain, under a
correct pattern of taxation.
108
See Fellows, Future Costs Reconsidered: A Reevaluation of IRC Section 461(h), 44
Tax Notes 1531, 1532-37 (Sept. 25, 1989) (arguing that the bifurcation approach to future
costs is correct and that section 461(h) represents a debatable surrogate taxation of
obligors).
181
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future costs, the transaction will be undertaxed if a current tax
cannot be imposed upon the recipient in the same period for which
a deduction is extended to the obligor. 164. Because in practice such
an inclusion in income cannot be achieved, any approach to future
costs that permitted a deduction in advance of payment would
often result in an imbalanced pattern of taxation.
First, a tax may not be imposed upon a recipient until the recipient can be identified. Thus, for example, Bob might have had an
obligation to restore his own land following a strip mining operation. The ultimate beneficiary of that cost would be the general
public, but the public will not be taxed at any time on its generalized increase in well-being. Bob might hire a contractor to accom·
plish the restoration and a surrogate tax might be imposed upon
that contractor. However, until the contractor is identified and
hired (most likely in year 6), no such tax can be imposed. As a
result, in a wide range of circumstances, recipients cannot be taxed
prior to the actual discharge of the future obligation. 1611
Second, even where the recipient can be readily identified, the
imposition of an offsetting tax liability may not be permissible
under one of the Code rules that defers or exempts the income
from tax. On the modified facts of Case Two, for example, Distributor would not derive taxable income from the return of its property in a restored condition - a result that is not unsound. 166
More generally, one Code rule that would prevent the surr~gate
taxation of payees is the cash method of accounting. 167 U~der this
method of accounting, an identified and fully taxabie recipient
would not be required to include any amount in income prior to an
actual payment. Thus, conforming inclusions in income to deduc184

Professor Halperin has observed that a correct burden of taxation can be achieved in
the absence of temporal matching of income and deduction if the deduction is limited to the
present value, using an after-tax rate of interest, of the future cost, while the recipient is
taxed on the future value of that amount. See Halperin, supra note 154, at 520-23. In the
example used in the text, the transaction would be correctly taxed if Bob was entitled to a
deduction for $6,667 in year 1 and Distributor was required to report income of $10,000 in
year 6. That treatment would be correct because taxing the Distributor on $10,000 in year 6
is the equivalent of taxing it on $6,667 in year 1. However, when the amount deducted and
the amount reflected in income are identical, a correct tax result is only achieved if the
items are reflected in the same year.
••• See Cunningham, supra note 116, at 614-15.
••• See I.R.C. § 109. Under these circumstances, it is not at all clear that Distributor
would have derived a gain.
187
See I.R.C. § 446(c).
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tions in advance of payment would require the virtual repeal of the
cash method of accounting. In short, any attempt to implement the
taxation of recipients in advance of an actual payment would require an extensive modification of otherwise entirely sound rules of
the Code. 168
In these circumstances, surrogate taxation cannot justify the acceleration of a deduction for future costs. Indeed, the need for accurately timing the deduction of a future cost is greater than the
need for the accurate taxation of receipts. This is so because the
inability to impose offsetting treatment upon payees is attributable
to insurmountable factual as well as legal obstacles. Accordingly, to
prevent an improper subsidy, the tax benefit attributable to an ob. ligation .to incur a future cost inust be deferred until the obligor
sustains a present economic detriment.
C.

Converted Transactions

If a market rate of interest has been paid on a loan for which the
principal has not been repaid, the conversion to income will be correctly taxed without regard to surrogate taxation. However, if
neither principal nor interest is repaid, the borrower will be undertaxed. In a normal lending transaction, the undertaxation of the
borrower upon the cancellation of debt will be balanced by the
treatment of the lender. Thus, in Case Three, if Carrie made no
repayments of principal or interest on her receipt, she would only
be sub]ect to a net tax on $10,000 in year 6. That level of taxation
is inadequate because, ideally, Carrie should be subject to a burden
of taxation equivalent to imposing a tax on the $10,000 receipt in
year 1 plus imposing an interest charge for deferring payment of
that tax until year 6. However, that undertaxation would be hal••• Allowing obligors to claim a series of deductions in advance of an actual payment,
under the bifurcation approach, would pose the serious problem of excessive complexity.
Both the obligor and the recipient would be required to reflect their transaction over a
period of years pursuant to a complex formula. In one specific instance, Congress has required just such a result. Under § 467 of the Code, when certain large rental payments are
deferred beyond the year of use, the amount treated as rent is reconstructed under § 7872
principles. Thus, the amount treated as rent is the present value of the payment obligation,
and that amount is both deductible and taxable in the year of usage. The difference between that present value and the face amount of the obligation is treated as interest that
both parties must reflect annually over the period during which payment is deferred. Examination of § 467 reveals that it is far too complex to be applied to a much broader range of
transactions.

654

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 10:587

anced by the overtaxation of the lender. In year 6 the lender would
only receive a bad debt loss of the same $10,000 upon which Carrie
was actually taxed. 169 Under the logic of the taxing system, the
lender would not be entitled to any tax benefit attributable to his
failure to collect interest during the outstanding period of the loan.
This failure to collect income relieves the taxpayer from any tax on
the uncollected amount, but does not produce any further income
tax benefit.
In retrospect, however, it may be seen that the lender has been
left in the same economic position as if he had sustained a loss in
year 1 and, from that perspective, has suffered from deferring his
loss over the six year period. Ideally, the lender should be entitled
to a benefit equivalent to the value of deducting the loss in year 1
and rec~iving interest on the deferral of the tax benefit to year 6.
This would correspond to the ideal burden on Carrie. Under present law, however, the receipt of a lesser loss precisely offsets the
benefit derived by Carrie from deferring her tax burden for the
same period of time. Thus, as in the case of the imperfect taxation
of the initial receipt, the imperfect taxation of the cancellation of
the indebtedness may have no revenue effect. Rather, this aspect
of the sub-system for taxing debt may only result in the undertaxation of the recipient and the corresponding overtaxation of
lenders. 170
The balance in the taxation of a debt cancellation, however, will
be upset if the lender is not entitled to a loss upon the failure to
repay. If the lender's loss is not deductible regardless of the treatment of the borrower, the undertaxation of the borrower will not
be offset by the overtaxation of the lender. As a result, taxing the

As a statutory matter, this result is required by § 166(b), which limits the loss to the
taxpayer's tax basis in the debt. In general, that basis would be the principal amount that
was loaned. See I.R.C. § 1012.
••• There is, however, an important difference between the imperfect taxation of the ini·
tial receipt and the imperfect taxation of the conversion of a transaction. Even if Carrie and
her lender knew how the income tax rules would apply to their transaction, they could not
adjust their transaction to allow for those rules because they would not know at the inception of the loan that it would not be repaid. As a result, the element of unfairness created by
the imperfect taxation of converted transactions cannot be eliminated by private action.
The parties could, of course, provide in their original loan agreement that upon a default in
repayment, damages in the amount of the tax benefit obtained by the borrower would be
paid to the lender. However, since by hypothesis the borrower has failed to repay the principal of the loan, it seems unlikely that such a provision would be fruitful.
180
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cancellation of both principal and interest repayments will translate into an improper revenue loss. For example, the loan to Carrie
in Case Three might have been made by a corporation in which she
was a principal stockholder. In this scenario, the failure of repayment might be treated as a dividend, taxable to her but non-deductible by the corporate "lender:" Under these conditions, the
undertaxation of Carrie will not be offset by the overtaxation of
the lender; the lender is merely deprived of a deduction that it
could not have claimed in any event. 171 Accordingly, the undertaxation of borrowers who do not pay interest on cancelled loans results in a subsidy to taxpayers, as well as a material revenue loss if
the lender is not entitled to deduct his failure to collect the
amount of the loan.
A situation in which a lender could not deduct the loss produced
by a failure of repayment would, of course, parallel the circumstances in which the payor would not be able to deduct the initial
payment. In Indianapolis Power, for example, most of the deposits
were not repaid, but instead were applied towards the customer's
electric bill. 172 Had those deposits been treated as the proceeds of a
loan despite earning no interest, the conversion of the deposit
would have been taxable to the utility at the time of conversion thereby undertaxing the utility. However, the non-business depositors would not have been entitled to any deduction with respect to
their payments, regardless of the treatment of the utility. Thus,
the undertaxation of the utility would not have been offset by the
overtaxation of the customers, and the pattern for taxing the
transactions would have generated an improper revenue loss.
A similarly troublesome revenue loss accompanies the operation

Under an ideal pattern of taxation, Carrie would be subject to a tax on the receipt and
would be required to pay interest on the deferral of the payment of that tax for six years.
However, the corporate lender would not be entitled to any deduction and thus would not
be entitled to any interest on the deferral of that deduction. Thus, under an ideal pattern of
taxation, the net revenue generated by the complete cancellation of the loan would exceed
the tax levied on $10,000 by the amount of the interest paid on that tax.
Under current law, however, Carrie would only be subject to a tax on $10,000 in year 6,
and would owe no tax attributable to the cancellation of the obligation to pay interest.
Thus, as compared to an ideal pattern of taxation, the net tax paid on the cancellation is
less than the correct amount of tax by an amount equal to the interest on the deferred tax
liability. Since, by hypothesis, the cancellation does not have any income tax consequence to
the lender, the undertaxation of the borrower is not offset by the overtaxation of the lender.
171
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
171
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of section 7872 of the Code. Under the bifurcation approach
adopted by that section, a form of discounted debt is created and a
failure of repayment is likely to extend to interest as well as principal. If that failure of repayment occurs, the borrower, as has been
seen, will be undertaxed. To the extent that the payor would not
be entitled to a current deduction for the transfer (or would be
entitled to a tax benefit of lesser magnitude than the tax imposed
upon the recipient), that undertaxation of the borrower will result
in the undertaxation of the transaction as a whole. This will always
be the result, for .example, with respect to the dividend resulting
from a shareholder's failure to repay a loan from a corporation. To
the extent that such loans to shareholders are not in fact repaid,
which in all likelihood is a common occurrence, the bifurcation approach of section 7872 will not achieve the proper level of taxation
for the transaction as a whole.
Just as surrogate taxation cannot be relied upon in the taxation
of receipts, it cannot be relied upon to correct the taxation of the
conversion of non-interest bearing debt to income. The systematic
undertaxation of discounted debt cancellations too often will not
be offset by the overtaxation of lenders. Indeed, a correct level of
taxation on interest-free receipts can only be achieved through the
avoidance of discounted debt and the taxation of the entire receipt
when it is obtained.
VIII.

CoNSISTENCY CoNSIDERATIONS: CoNVERTING INcOME To
DEBT

If a taxpayer obtains a receipt that, at the end of the taxable
year, appears not to be subject to an obligation to repay, the proceeds will be taxed in the year of receipt. If the taxpayer later becomes obligated to return the receipt and does so, he will then be
entitled to a tax deduction in the later year of repayment. 173 The
annual accounting system has always been interpreted to prevent
reopening the earlier return and claiming the loss against the initial return of income. 174
Returned receipts, however, are economically identical to loans:
171

See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591-92 (1951).
,.. See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1931). The notion persists,
however, that reopening the initial return would be a superior solution. See Hillsboro Nat'l
Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 425-26 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the taxpayer has obtained value, invested it over a period of years,
and returned the original receipt - perhaps along with interest
computed on the principal amount. Ideally, therefore, the burden
of taxation imposed upon a returned receipt should be identical to
the burden imposed upon debt. Under present law, however, converted income transactions are subject to a pattern of taxation that
is vastly different from that applicable to debt.
CASE FOUR
Pursuant to its established bonus compensation plan, at the end of
the year Employer pays Don $10,000. A later review of Don's per. formance for that year discloses that he was not entitled to any
bonus at all. Six years after the initial receipt, Don returns the
$10,000 to Employer. Both Don and Employer are subject to a 30%
rate of tax. Don paid a tax of $3,000 on the bonus and invested the
balance, obtaining a 10% pre-tax return.

In year 6, if Don not only returned the $10,000 but also paid
10% interest on that amount, he will be seriously overtaxed. Over
the six years, his investment will have grown to $10,500 at his after-tax rate of return of 7%. However, the obligation to repay the
receipt with interest will amount to $17,700. The tax benefit from
deducting that entire amount will be $5,310, producing a net cost
of repayment of $12,390. As a result, Don will be required to repay
$1,890 more than he derived from the transaction and thus will
incur a net economic loss in that amount.
· This result is not at all surprising. Don was only able to invest
the after-tax proceeds of his bonus, yet was required to pay interest on the pre-tax amount. In Case One, Abbie received similar
treatment as a result of her including as income all the proceeds of
an interest-bearing loan. In Abbie's case, taxation converted a
transaction that produced an economic wash into one that produced an after-tax economic loss, because the imposition of tax improperly prevented Abbie from funding the obligation to pay interest. For precisely the same reason, imposing the same burden of
taxation on Don would be improper. 175
170

Since Don cannot be helped by revising the definition of debt, his problem, while serious, is not further addressed here. The appropriate relief for Don would be the ability to
carry his loss back to year 1 and obtain interest on the refund of the tax paid in that year.
Under current law, however, Don's only relief is the ability to elect, under § 1341, between
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If Don were not required to pay interest on the repayment of his
bonus compensation, however, his transaction would resemble not
Abbie's but Bob's. Upon repayment of the receipt, Don would be
in the same position economically as a taxpayer who obtained and
repaid an interest-free loan. Viewing the transaction in retrospect,.
Don received the equivalent of an interest-free loan maturing in
six years, and thus should be subject to the same pattern of taxation used for the recipients of interest-free loans. Under section
7872 of the Code, such a loan would be bifurcated and partially
taxed upon receipt.
In Case Four, however, this option would not be available in
practice. Since it was not known in year 1 that the receipt would
have to be repaid, it would be impossible to apply the section 7872
bifurcation approach to Don on the initial receipt. Thus, if bifurcation were to be applied, it would have to be done retroactively, in a
later year in which repayment would be required. Implementing
such an approach would require computing in year 6 the amount
that should have been treated as a loan in year 1, and granting the
taxpayer a refund of the tax paid on that amount, with interest
over the six years. While possible in principle, such an approach to
the taxation of returned income would not appear to be feasib~e in
practice. The computation of tax liability would be complex - and
excessively so, given the relative simplicity of the transaction subject to tax. 176 Moreover, granting a tax refund with interest would
be significantly more advantageous to taxpayers than a mere deduction, thus creating incentives for taxpayer manipulation. As a
result, applying the bifurcation approach to the taxation of returned income simply is not a viable option. The only practical
pattern of taxation would involve subjecting the receipt to current
taxation in full and allowing Don a deduction for any amount actually repaid in the year of repayment.

claiming a tax credit or a deduction for his repayment.
118
If it were possible to bifurcate such a receipt retroactively as to the recipient, thereby
reducing his income tax liability, it would also be necessary to increase retroactively the
payor's level of taxation. To the extent that the receipt was treated as a non-taxable loan to
the recipient, it would have to be treated as a non-deductible loan by the payor. That treatment of the payor, while entirely correct in principle, would not be sound in practice. In
addition to the actual harshness of the imposition of such a tax, the retroactive loss of a
deduction would be perceived as a wholly unfair price for demanding the repayment of an
amount mistakenly transferred to an employee or other payee. ·
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For the reasons detailed above, treating returned income in this
manner is entirely appropriate. The net effect of applying this pattern of taxation to Don would be to subject him to the rules of the
sub-system for taxing income over the six years during which he
retained the bonus. Since Don was not required to pay interest on
the receipt, and thus was entitled to retain the full return from his
investment, he derived the economic benefits of income and was
not subject to ariy of the economic burdens of debt. Accordingly,
his receipt ought to be subject to the rules of the sub-system for
taxing income, not the sub-system for taxing debt. The deduction
allowed upon the ultimate repayment of the previously taxed income adequately compensates him for the initial overtaxation.
Subjecting Don's receipt to immediate taxation in full is, of
course, the result reached under present law. However, this treatment of returned income is sharply inconsistent with section 7872's
bifurcation approach to economically identical receipts of interestfree loans. Such a major inconsistency is undesirable in any taxing
system, and should be avoided whenever possible. Accordingly, the
treatment of Don's returned income strongly reinforces the conclusion that Bob's interest-free loan should also be subject to immediate taxation, and should not be bifurcated under section 7872 of
the Code. The complex reconstruction mandated by that provision
is simply inconsistent with other appropriate and long-standing
rules of-the taxing system.
IX.

CoNCLUSION:

A

PROPER DEFINITION oF DEBT

Characterizing a receipt as a loan, or in the nature of a loan,
· means that the receipt will be subject to the specialized rules of
the sub-system for taxing debt. Of those rules, the most dramatic
is the total exclusion from taxable income accorded to the proceeds
of a loan. That exclusion, however, is not intended as a tax subsidy
for borrowing; it is extended because it is wrong to impose tax on
an amount that does not represent an increase in net worth. Diminishing such a receipt through taxation would deprive the recipient of the ability to fund the obligation to pay interest on the
receipt, and thus would convert an economically neutral transaction into one yielding an after-tax economic loss.
On the other hand, the failure to impose a tax on a receipt that
does represent an increase in net worth is also improper. In this
situation, the recipient is able to invest pre-tax funds for his or her
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own account and thus can obtain a greater after-tax return than a
taxpayer who had been subject to the normal operation of the income tax. Relative to normally taxed receipts, untaxed receipts are
preferential and, under an ideal income tax system, improper.
In determining whether a receipt represents an increase in net
worth, and the extent of that increase, the repayment obligation
must be valued by taking into account the time value of money.
The failure to do so would treat a receipt upon which a market
rate of interest must be paid as equivalent in value to a receipt
upon which no interest must be paid. This is an "equivalence" that
plainly does not exist. The non-interest bearing receipt generates a
return that may be retained by the taxpayer, while the interestbearing receipt generates no such return and thus is of substantially lesser value. On the one hand, disregarding the value of an
interest-free receipt avoids one of the levels of tax imposed by an
income tax, and thus improperly subsidizes interest-free receipts.
On the other hand, disregarding the lack of value in an interestbearing receipt imposes a tax in the absence of gain and thus excessively taxes interest-bearing obligations.
In a wide range of contexts, the courts have been willing to entertain, and sometimes accept, a variety of arguments leading towards the exemption from current taxation of non-interest bearing
receipts. 177 It has been demonstrated here that in every context,
that result is improper. To achieve a correct allocation of th'e tax
burden, all interest-free receipts - whether in the form of loans,
advance payments, or deductions for future costs - must be subject to taxation in full when the receipt is obtained. In other contexts, the courts have been willing to entertain the argument that a
receipt bearing a market rate of interest that was actually. paid
should nevertheless be fully subject to tax. 178 It has also been
demonstrated here that such a tax would improperly overtax
recipients.
To secure a correct level of taxation on receipts that are offset
by obligations of any sort, the Supreme Court must learn to appreciate the significance of the time value of money, while simultaneously ending its reliance on control over the principal amount
117
See, e.g., Cohen v. Commissioner, 910 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1990); Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
178
See, e.g., Mason v. U.S., 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
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transferred. Such an economically irrelevant issue should not be
the lynchpin of decisions over whether to exclude a receipt from
income because of an offsetting obligation. Rather, the pattern of
taxation provided by the sub-system for taxing debt must be reserved for receipts that are offset by obligations that actually bear
a market rate of interest that the borrower intends to pay in good
faith. 179 Moreover, since the conversion of a loan to income is correctly taxed if a market rate of interest has been paid on the receipt, that exclusion should not be affected by the probability that
the principal amount of the receipt will actually be repaid. Since
income is a question of value, not control, exclusion simply should
not be affected by the degree to which the borrower or the lender
controls repayment.
Because of the inadequacies contained in the judicial definition
of debt, Congress adopted an alternative definition based upon the
time value of money. That definition, however, was derived from
an earlier effort to identify an element of interest that was assumed to exist. As a result, an interest-free receipt was converted
into an interest-bearing receipt that was exempt from tax. The effect of this exemption has been to permit the investment of a pretax receipt - clearly an improper result.
While the congressional approach represents a substantial improvement over the judicial approach to the definition of debt, it
also fails to produce a correct result. The artificial creation of interest does not properly implement time value of money principles.
Unless interest is actually paid on a receipt, the receipt should not
be treated as debt, and the entire amount of the receipt should be
subject to immediate taxation in full. In that respect, the ali-ornothing feature of the traditional judicial approach to debt
emerges as entirely correct.
It would not be difficult for Congress and the judiciary to imple110

Nothing in this proposed scheme is intended to require treating any form of obligation
as debt, for income tax purposes, if the borrower lacks a bona fide intention to repay the
loan. For example, if a controlling shareholder of a closely-held corporation that does not
pay dividends forces the corporation to grant him loans, and the surrounding circumstances
suggest that the loans will not be repaid, the cash transfer might appropriately be treated as
a dividend - both under present law as well as in the proposals outlined in this article.
Similarly, an obligation need not be treated as an interest-bearing obligation unless the
borrower has a bona fide intention to pay the interest stated. Absent that intention, the
obligation to pay interest is worthless and should be disregarded.
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ment the reforms advocated in this article. Indeed, the proposals
presented here would greatly simplify and rationalize both the taxation of low-interest loans and a wide range of classification issues
that have recurred with frequency. As a result, a more correct and
consistent allocation of the tax burden could be achieved, along
with a reduction in. the frequency of many income tax
controversies.
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CASE ILLUSTRATIONS
CASE ONE

Abbie, a key employee of Distributor, Inc., has obtained a $10,000
loan from Distributor, giving in exchange her personal note. The
note matures in six years and bears interest at a market rate of
10%, payable annually. However, at Abbie's option, the note can at
any time be applied to reduce outstanding accounts receivable due
Abbie for the Distributor's purchase of goods from her. Both Abbie
and Distributor are subject to a marginal rate of tax of 30%, and
both can earn a 10% pre-tax return on their investments.

CASE TWO
Like Abbie, Bob is employed by Distributor and obtains a $10,000
loan from his employer. The note given by Bob in exchange for the
loan also matures in six years but does not bear any stated interest.
Bob is also subject to a marginal tax rate of 30% and can earn a
10% pre-tax return on his investments.

CASE TWO (DEDUCTION)
Distributor allows Bob to use its real property as a site for a
World's Fair, but on the condition that at the conclusion of the
Fair, Bob will restore the site to its original condition. Restoration
will occur in six years and can be predicted to cost $10,000. Bob
remains subject to a 30% rate of tax and can earn a pre-tax return
of 10% on his investments.

CASE THREE
Carrie has borrowed $10,000 on a note that matures in six years
and bears a market rate of interest of 10%. The proceeds of the
note have been reinvested by Carrie, also at a 10% return. Carrie is
subject to a marginal tax rate of 30%.

CASE FOUR
Pursuant to its established bonus compensation plan, at the end of
the year Employer pays Don $10,000. A later review of Dan's performance for that year discloses that he was not entitled to any
bonus at all. Six years after the initial receipt, Don returns the
$10,000 to Employer. Both Don and Employer are subject to a 30%.
rate of tax. Don paid a tax of $3,000 on the bonus and invested the
balance, obtaining a 10% pre-tax return.

